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“We are in the business of rigging elections.”
North Carolina state senator2
“We are going to shove [the district map] up your fu*king ass and you are going to like it, and I’ll
fu*ck any Republican I can.”
Democratic chairman regarding the new districting plan for
Democratic-led county board in Illinois3
“[W]e are going to draw the lines so that Republicans will be in oblivion in the state of New York
for the next 20 years.”
Malcolm Smith, New York State Senate president4
“It is fair to infer that partisan considerations may have played a significant role in the decision to
enact” Indiana’s voter identification law.
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 128 S.Ct. 1610, 1624
(2008) (Stevens, J., plural. op).
“Too often, Members’ first thought is not what is right or what they believe, but how it will affect
fundraising. Who, after all, can seriously contend that a $100,000 donation does not alter the way
one thinks about – and quite possibly votes on – an issue? . . .”
Alan Simpson, former United States Senator5
“Even a cursory survey of world events over the last 20 – or 100 – years makes plain that
democracies are fragile, that democratic institutions can be undermined from within. Ours are no
exception.”
Alexander Keyssar6

I.

INTRODUCTION

Representative democracy does not spontaneously occur by citizens
gathering to choose laws. Instead, republicanism takes place within an
extensive legal framework that determines who gets to vote, how campaigns
are conducted, what conditions must be met for representatives to make
valid law, and many other things. Many of these “rules-of-the-road” that
operationalize representative democracy have been subject to constitutional
challenges in recent decades. For example, lawsuits have been brought
against “partisan gerrymandering,” which has contributed to most
congressional districts not being party-competitive, but instead being safely
See Hoefel, Six Incumbents Are a Week Away from Easy Election, WinstonSalem Journal, Jan. 27, 1998, p. B1, quoted in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317
(2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
3 JONATHAN WINBURN, THE REALITIES OF REDISTRICTING 1 (Lexington
Books 2008).
4 “He Probably Didn’t Mean To,” THE NEW YORK TIMES, page A28, May 6, 2010.
5 McConnell et al. v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 149 (2003).
6 “The Strange Career of Voter Suppression,” THE NEW YORK TIMES, page A19,
February 13, 2012.
2
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Republican or Democratic,7 and against onerous voter identification
requirements that reduce the voting rates of certain voting populations.8
These constitutional challenges were based on individual rights claims
that were grounded in Equal Protection or Free Speech. This Article’s
principle argument is that the rules-of-the-road of representative democracy
also implicate a structural constitutional principle, wholly independent of
individual rights based claims, that to date has gone unnoticed: “Republican
Legitimacy.”9 The Article explains Republican Legitimacy’s source and
content, the costs of failing to recognize it, and the payoffs of doing so.
Republican Legitimacy’s derivation is relatively straightforward. The
Constitution establishes a federal government that essentially is a
representative democracy, i.e., a republican form of government. The
Constitution also guarantees a republican form of government to the states.
The Constitution’s establishment and guarantee of republicanism across the
federal and state governments encompass the necessary preconditions for
these republican forms of government to successfully and legitimately
operate. These preconditions are the contents of the constitutional principle
of Republican Legitimacy.
Republican Legitimacy’s absence has led to egregious conduct by
legislatures and distorted judicial analyses. As to legislatures, look again at the
shocking statements collected in the prologue:10 legislators acknowledging
that they “are in the business of rigging elections,”11 that “we are going to
draw the lines so that Republicans will be in oblivion in the state of New
York for the next 20 years,”12 and that campaign “donations . . . alter the
way one thinks about – and quite possibly votes on – an issue . . .”13 The
harm is not just to individuals, but to republican government itself.

See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); see Sam Hirsch, The United States
House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the Latest Round of Congressional
Redistricting, 3 ELECTION L. J. 179 (2003) (providing exhaustive analysis of
gerrymandering of congressional districts); Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes
Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders,
116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 663-64 (2002) (noting that most congressional districts are
safely democratic or republican); but See Rhodes Cook, Congressional Redistricting: Is
Creating
“Safe”
Districts
a
Dying
Art?,
http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/frc2011033101 (March 31,
2011) (concluding that “safe congressional seats will always be with us, but probably
not as many as their most ambitious creators would want”).
8 Crawford v. Merion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
9 The closest anyone else has come is Professor Teachout, who has proposed
that the Constitution contains an “anti-corruption” principle. See Zephyr Teachout,
The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 341 (2009). Part II.C.3 explains why
Republican Legitimacy is doctrinally and conceptually superior to “anti-corruption.”
10 See supra text and notes 2 - 8.
11 See supra note 2.
12 See supra note 4.
13 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 149 (quoting former U.S. Senator Alan Simpson).
7
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More generally, inattentiveness to Republican Legitimacy has led
legislators to think that democracy’s rules-of-the-road are a part of ordinary
politics. Republican Legitimacy makes clear that politicians have a special
duty to act with a higher order of care when choosing the rules-of-the-road:
they must act in accordance with “tempered” rather than “hardball” politics.
As skeptical as one may be of politicians, there is no reason to assume
legislators would not take seriously their oaths to uphold the Constitution
once they understood it included Republican Legitimacy. Furthermore, there
are steps that courts and Congress can take to encourage state legislatures -the institutions presumptively responsible for most of the rules-of-the-road
under the Constitution14 – to act consistently with “tempered politics.”
As to courts, the individual rights doctrines they have invoked have
left vulnerable the structural interests of Republican Legitimacy. Republican
Legitimacy identifies legally significant facts that are overlooked by rights
doctrines that focus primarily on individuals, provides conceptual traction
that rights-based doctrines do not, and makes clear why various subdoctrines developed in the individual-rights context that limit judicial review
have no rightful application in respect of a structural principle like
Republican Legitimacy.
This Article’s argument unfolds in five parts. Part II explains the
doctrinal source of Republican Legitimacy, as well as its contents. Like the
constitutional principles of separation of powers and federalism, Republican
Legitimacy is a structural principle that protects and effectuates the
republican institutions that are created and guaranteed by the Constitution.
Republican Legitimacy secures the conditions that must pertain for decisions
of the people’s representatives to legitimately bind the people. Drawing
primarily on political theory, Part II explains that Republican Legitimacy has
two components: (1) the mechanisms for determining who will be the
representatives in a republican form of government and (2) the decisionmaking processes that the representatives use in generating the laws that are
to bind the polity. Part II then anticipates several possible objections, and
explains why Republican Legitimacy is conceptually and doctrinally superior
to the “anti-corruption” principle that is found in some case law and has
been discussed by some scholars.15
Part III then considers to what extent Republican Legitimacy is
already present in the Court’s jurisprudence. It first shows that many
Supreme Court decisions have recognized the significance of the two
components of Republican Legitimacy. Most of these decisions, however,
have folded these considerations into the individual-rights doctrines of equal
protection and free speech. Part III explains why it is critical that Republican
Legitimacy be recognized as a structural constitutional principle that is
independent of the individual rights-based doctrines of equal protection and
free speech.
14
15

See U.S. CONST. ART. I, §4, cl. 1.
See supra note 9.
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Part IV demonstrates Republican Legitimacy’s explanatory power by
applying it to three recent Supreme Court decisions. Republican Legitimacy
illuminates troublesome features of Indiana’s strict voter identification law
that were not treated as legally significant under Justice Stevens’ plurality
opinion in Crawford v. v. Merion County Election Board,16 and explains why a
successful challenge would not require a showing of discriminatory intent,
pace Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion. Part IV then uses Republican
Legitimacy to critique the Vieth v. Jubelirer17 decision, which essentially
declared political gerrymandering to be non-justiciable.18 Republican
Legitimacy identifies heretofore unrecognized common ground shared by
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and the four Vieth dissenters that conceivably
could have led to a different result in the case.
Part IV then applies Republican Legitimacy to the Court’s divisive
decision of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,19 which invoked the
First Amendment to strike down the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s
prohibition against the use of corporate and union general treasury funds for
independent expenditures.20 Republican Legitimacy clarifies the nature and
significance of the governmental interest behind the Act’s expenditures
prohibition. Republican Legitimacy provides a more elegant and compelling
frame for understanding the welter of policies discussed in Justice Stevens’
dissent under the rubrics of “anti-corruption” and “anti-distortion,” and
Republican Legitimacy’s constitutional status explain why these policies
satisfy the compelling governmental interest requirement. Independent of
this, Part IV also shows that deciding whether corporate and union
expenditures should be banned implicated a conflict between competing
constitutional principles -- free speech and Republican Legitimacy – and
argues that Congress’ considered resolution of such a constitutional conflict
should have been entitled to substantial deference by the Court.
Part V provides a conclusion that also serves as a prologue to a
companion article that considers what roles different governmental and
societal institutions must play if Republican legitimacy is to be appropriately
guarded.21 Courts have a vital role to play, as this Article shows, but so do
the legislatures themselves.
II. TEXTUAL AND CONCEPTUAL DERIVATION OF REPUBLICAN LEGITIMACY
This Part II explains the derivation and contents of Republican
Legitimacy. It proceeds in three steps. Part II.A. explains from where in the
553 U.S. 181 (2008).
541 U.S. 267 (2004).
18 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which provided the crucial fifth vote, left only
a small window open for political gerrymandering claims. See infra Part IV.B.
19 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
20 See id. at 887.
21 See Mark D. Rosen, Implementing Republican Legitimacy: Courts and Tempered
Politics (manuscript).
16
17
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Constitution Republican Legitimacy is derived.
Part II.B explains
Republican Legitimacy’s contents. Part II.C anticipates and responds to
three arguments that may be leveled against the claim that Republican
Legitimacy is an independent structural constitutional principle.
A.

Republican Legitimacy’s Doctrinal Derivation

Republican Legitimacy is a structural constitutional principle that
derives from five constitutional provisions that together establish that the
federal and state governments are essentially republican in character insofar
as governmental power is exercised by representatives who ultimately are
answerable to citizens.22 The first provision is Article I’s charge that the
House of Representatives “shall be composed of Members chosen . . . by the
People.”23 The second is the Seventeenth Amendment’s instruction that the
Senate be composed of Senators “elected by the people . . .”24 The third are
the constitutional provisions, as supplemented by custom, that establish that
the president is essentially popularly elected.25 Fourth, the republican
character of all these popularly elected institutions is confirmed, and has been
deepened, by the Amendments that have expanded the franchise, namely the
Fifteenth (race, color, or previous condition of servitude), Nineteenth
(women), Twenty-fourth (proscribing poll taxes), and Twenty-Sixth
Amendments (age). Fifth, and finally, the Guarantee Clause provides that
“[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government . . .”26

22To

be sure, many different concepts of “republican” can be located among
Americans during the Founding era. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 276-81 (demonstrating that many in the Framer’s
generation treated democracy and republican interchangeably); GORDON S. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 48-90, 593-618
(describing the evolution of the meaning of “republicanism” between the
Revolution and 1787). I draw upon Madison’s understanding of republicanism in
Federalist 10, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 81-84 (J. Madison) (Rossiter ed),
which has become the accepted definition today, see AMAR, supra at 276.
23 U.S. Const. Art. I, §2, cl. 2.
24 U.S. Const., Amend. 17.
25Although Article II only provides that the President shall be elected by
“Electors” appointed by the state legislatures, it long has been understood that the
federal government is a “government whose essential character is republican, whose
executive head and legislative body are both elective . . .” Ex parte Yarbrough, 110
U.S. 651, 657 (1884). The Twenty-third Amendment strengthens the President’s
republican character by guaranteeing that the people residing in the District of
Columbia can participate in his election.
26 U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 4. My claim that the Guarantee Clause is the source of a
constitutional principle binding states and the federal government is unaffected by
the Clause’s having been held to be a nonjusticiable political question, See Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218-20 (1962), because non-justiciable constitutional questions
are still binding, even if they are not judicially enforceable. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at
292. Further, the Court has held that the Guarantee Clause is enforceable by
Congress, see Baker, 369 U.S. at 220, and my proposal places primary responsible
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Republican Legitimacy’s derivation from the above provisions is
straightforward:
The Constitution’s establishment and guarantee of
republican forms of government include the minimum powers and
limitations that are necessary to protect and effectuate these republican
institutions. These powers and limitations are themselves of constitutional
dimension, and they constitute the structural constitutional principle of
Republican Legitimacy.27
The Supreme Court has recognized other non-explicit, structural
constitutional principles on the ground that they are necessary to preserve or
effectuate institutions created by, or recognized by, the Constitution. Most of
these structural principles function as limitations on expressly granted
constitutional powers, but some principles have been the source of
affirmative governmental powers.
The two best known structural principles that operate as
constitutional limitations are separation-of-powers and federalism. In
Morrison v. Olson,28 for example, the Court held that Congress can restrict the
President’s power to remove executive officials only insofar as it “does not
interfere with the President’s exercise of the ‘executive power’ and his
constitutionally appointed duty to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.”29 What was necessary to preserve the President’s explicitly created
constitutional powers thus constituted an implied constitutional limitation on
Congress’ powers. Similarly, the Court in New York v. U.S.30 held that
Congress could not “commandeer” state legislatures, notwithstanding the
absence of an express constitutional provision barring Congress from doing
so, because such an anti-commandeering rule was necessary to “protect the
sovereignty of states.”31 Republican Legitimacy is similarly derived: it is a
constitutional principle that consists of what is necessary to preserve the
representative democracy that our Constitution creates (vis-à-vis the federal
government) and guarantees (vis-à-vis the states).
Separation of powers and federalism are not the only examples of
for enforcing Republican Legitimacy with Congress. See Rosen, Implementing
Republican Legitimacy, supra note 21.
27 Jack Balkin has similarly spoken of “democratic self governance” as a
structural principle. See Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2010).
28 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
29 Id. at 689-90; see also id. at 690 (holding that the Ethics in Government Act
“taken as a whole” does not “violate[] the principle of separation of powers by
unduly interfering with the role of the Executive Branch.”).
30 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
31 Id. at 181; see also id. at 177 (in “determining whether the Tenth Amendment
limits the ability of Congress to subject state governments to generally applicable
laws, the Court has in some cases stated that it will evaluate the strength of federal
interests in light of the degree to which such laws would prevent the State from
functioning as a sovereign; that is, the extent to which such generally applicable laws
would impede a state government's responsibility to represent and be accountable to
the citizens of the State.”).
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implied constitutional limitations that protect constitutionally created
institutions. Consider the case of U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,32 where
the Court held unconstitutional an Arkansas law establishing term limits for
congressmen from that state. No provision of the Constitution explicitly
forbade states from imposing term limits. The Court nonetheless found an
implied constitutional limitation, justifying it inter alia on the ground that it
was necessary to protect the constitutionally-created institution of the House
of Representatives: “The Constitution thus creates a uniform national body
representing the interests of a single people. Permitting individual States to
formulate diverse qualifications for their representatives would result in a
patchwork of state qualifications, undermining the uniformity and the
national character that the Framers envisioned and sought to ensure.”33
The Court also has found implied constitutional powers on the ground
that they were necessary to effectuate constitutionally-created institutions.
Consider first the constitutional executive privilege. The Court held in United
States v. Nixon that although “[n]owhere in the Constitution . . . is there any
explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to the extent this
interest relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers, it is
constitutionally based.”34 The Court’s conclusion that the executive privilege
is a constitutional power rested on pragmatic reasoning. “The privilege is
fundamental to the operation of Government because [a] President and
those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of
shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be
unwilling to express except privately.”35 There must be “candid, objective and
even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decisionmaking.”36
The Court also has found that Congress has implied constitutional
powers. Although the Constitution does not expressly grant Congress the
power to investigate, the Court held in McGrain v. Daugherty37 that Congress
has constitutional investigative powers because such powers are a
prerequisite to effective legislation. Congress “possesses not only such
powers as are expressly granted to them by the Constitution, but such
auxiliary powers as are necessary and appropriate to make the express powers
effective.”38 In determining what “auxiliary” powers were necessary to “make
the express powers effective,” the Court once again utilized pragmatic
reasoning. “A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself
possess the requisite information -- which not infrequently is true -- recourse
must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has taught that mere
514 U.S. 779 (1995).
Id. at 822.
34 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974).
35 Id. at 708.
36 Id.
37 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
38 Id. at 173.

32
33
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requests for such information often are unavailing, and also that information
which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed.”39
In short, separation-of-powers and federalism jurisprudence, as well
as the Thornton, Nixon, and McGrain decisions, all reasoned that powers and
limitations that were necessary to protect or effectuate expressly-created or
recognized constitutional institutions were themselves of constitutional
status. Republican Legitimacy is derivable on the same basis: the
Constitution expressly establishes a republican federal government and
guarantees that the states similarly will have republican governments, and
these constitutional institutions and guarantees include the minimum
conditions that are necessary to protect and effectuate these republican
forms of government.
***********************************
That the Court has found implied constitutional powers (and limits)
in other contexts does not, on its own, mean that it should do so here. The
Article’s next parts explain why Republican Legitimacy is another appropriate
constitutional inference. Part II.B draws on political theory to explain why
there must be a principle such as Republican Legitimacy if republican
institutions are to be well functioning and stable. This analysis permits the
construction of a framework that fleshes out Republican Legitimacy’s
concrete contents. Parts III.A and III.B show that many of the components
of Republican Legitimacy already have been recognized in case law.
Parts II.B and III.A-III.B are mutually reinforcing. Parts III.A-III.B
provide a doctrinal basis for Part II.B’s theoretical discussion. Further, Part
III serves as inductive support for Part II.B’s theoretical reasoning.40 In the
other direction, Part II.B’s analytical framework offers critical insights into
the Court’s jurisprudence. It makes clear that case law that until now has
been thought to address disparate subjects (such as limitations on the
franchise, term limits, and campaign finance) actually are part of a single
whole: they are aspects of the jurisprudence of Republican Legitimacy.
Part II.B’s framework also identifies two shortcomings in the case
law. First, some matters that the Court has treated as “compelling interests”
are actually part Republican Legitimacy, and hence are of independent
Id. at 175. The Court also noted that congressional investigate powers had a
long historical pedigree. See id. But the Court used the longstanding historical
practice as confirmation of the legislature’s pragmatic need of such a power, not as a
prerequisite to finding the constitutional power. See id. (“All this was true before
and when the Constitution was framed and adopted. In that period the power of
inquiry, with enforcing process, was regarded and employed as a necessary and
appropriate attribute of the power to legislate-indeed, was treated as inhering in it.
Thus there is ample warrant for thinking, as we do, that the constitutional
provisions which commit the legislative function to the two houses are intended to
include this attribute to the end that the function may be effectively exercised.”)
40 See infra note 210.
39
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constitutional status. Second, some matters that the Court has treated under
the rubric of individual rights instead are aspects of the structural
constitutional principle of Republican Legitimacy. Part III.C explains why it
is important that Republican Legitimacy be understood as an independent
constitutional principle that is structural rather than rights-based.
B.

Republican Legitimacy’s Content

The contents of Republican Legitimacy are best identified by asking
the following question: what conditions must be met for decisions of the
peoples’ representatives to legitimately bind the people?41 A governmental
system that cannot provide an adequate answer to this question cannot be
both free and stable.42 Jeremy Waldron sets up the issues nicely:
We imagine a decision being made by a certain process and we
imagine a citizen Cn– who is to be bound or burdened by the
decision – disagreeing with the decision and asking why she should
accept, comply, or put up with it. Some of those who support the
decision may try to persuade Cn that it is right in its substance. But
they may fail, not because of any obtuseness on her part, but
simply because Cn continues (not unreasonably) to hold a different
view on this vexed and serious matter. What then is to be said to
Cn? A plausible answer may be offered to her concerning the
process by which the decision was reached. Even though she
disagrees with the outcome, she may be able to accept that it was
arrived at fairly. The theory of such a process-based response is
the theory of political legitimacy.43

Waldron helpfully concludes that there are two components to a
theory of political legitimacy. First, there must be an appropriate mechanism
for selecting which individuals will make the community’s political decisions
(i.e., who will be the representatives in a republican form of government). I
shall call this the “Legitimate-Selection” component.
Second, the
representatives must themselves utilize an acceptable decision-procedure
when creating laws.44 Call this component “Legitimate-Decisionmaking.” In
short, Legitimate-Selection addresses the integrity of electoral results, whereas
Legitimate-Decisionmaking concerns legislative results.45

Cf. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 24 (defining a “reasonably just
(though not necessarily a fully just) constitutional democratic government” as a
“government [that] is effectively under th[e people’s] political and electoral control .
. .”).
42 See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 35 (describing the
requirement of a “well-ordered society” in which “citizens have a normally effective
sense of justice and so they generally comply with society’s basic institutions, which
they regard as just”).
43 See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L. J.
1346, 1387 (2006).
44 See id.
45 Sanford Levinson uses a similar two-part framework.
See SANFORD
LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 27.
41
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Legitimate-Selection

The constitutional principle of Republican Legitimacy comprises the
minimum requirements of the two aforementioned components. The
Legitimate-Selection component encompasses what Waldron helpfully calls
“the theory of fair elections to the legislature, elections in which people like
Cn were treated equally along with all their fellow citizens in determining who
should be privileged to be among the small number participating” in the lawmaking that will bind Cn and all other citizens.46 Pace Waldron’s formulation,
though, there is not a single “theory of fair elections,” but instead are multiple
legitimate contenders. For example, strong arguments can be made on behalf
of both majoritarian and proportional electoral systems.47
Reasonably controversial aspects of fair elections are not part of the
constitutional requirement of Republican Legitimacy (though they may well be
included in Waldron’s first component of political democracy). Instead,
Republican Legitimacy comprises matters about which there can be no
reasonable disagreement – matters that are veritable sine qua nons of a
republican system, such as the requirement of competitive elections for
important governmental officials. For example, a political system where
citizens vote only for or against a single candidate for their country’s chief
executive – as in the former Soviet Union and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq –
categorically fall outside the scope of a republican form of government.
Encompassed within Legitimate-Selection are such matters as who has the
franchise, how votes are cast (which in turn includes voter registration and
the mechanics of voting), and how votes are aggregated (i.e., whether districts
are used and, if so, how they are drawn). I will have much more to say
about Legitimate-Selection in Part IV.
2.

Legitimate-Decisionmaking

The contents of the second component of Republican Legitimacy –
Legitimate-Decisionmaking – are difficult to specify. For example, while
majority rule might be thought to be part of the second component, there are
strong reasons to resist this conclusion.48 Probably the most important
Id. at 1387.
For a useful discussion, see CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND
ALTERNATIVES (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds. 1984).
48 Waldron provides a brief but spirited defense of the principle of majority
decision, see Waldron, supra note 43, at 1388, but his claim that majority
decisionmaking is necessary to political legitimacy is doubtful. Majority rule in fact
is normatively controversial. See AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND
SOCIAL WELFARE 161-63 (1970); VERMEULE, supra note 49, at 7; John O. McGinnis
& Michael B. Rappaport, Majority and Supermajority Rules: Three Views of the Capitol, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1115 (2007). Further, some aspects of the Constitution (such as the
Treaty Clause) explicitly demand a supermajority, and it has been persuasively
argued that our Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements
effectively operate as a supermajority requirement. See id.
46
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aspect of Legitimate-Decisionmaking derives from the fact that virtually all
theories of democracy incorporate a requirement that, when government
acts, it act for the purpose of promoting the “public good, somehow
defined” and, conversely, that “self-interested behavior by government
officials” is illegitimate.49
Indeed, “public good” requirements are a central component of the
theories of many of the most important political theorists, past and present.
A central concern of Western political theory has been to explain why the
state can justifiably compel individuals against their will, and the limits of that
power.50 “Public good” requirements have played a central role in answering
these crucial questions.51
According to John Locke, for example, the legislature has power to
enact laws only because “the public has chosen and appointed” the
legislature.52 This consent is the sine qua non of law’s legitimacy for Locke:
what is “absolutely necessary to . . . a law” is that the law have emanated
from a body that has “the consent of the society, over whom nobody can
have a power to make laws, but by their own consent and by authority
received from them.”53 Legislative power accordingly can extend only to the
powers that the legislature has been granted by the people. And this
principle determines the outer limit of legislative power: because “nobody
can transfer to another more power than he has in himself,” the legislature
can have no more power than “those persons had in a state of nature before
they entered into society and gave up to the community.”54 Locke
understands man’s powers under the law of nature to extend only to “the
Cf. ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN WRIT SMALL 4-5 (2007); see also id. at 34 (“Disagreement about the
uniquely best definition of impartiality need not prove an embarrassment to the
limited ambitions of real-world democratic design, which are fully satisfied by
identifying a set of decisions that all competing definitions of impartiality
condemn.”).
50 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 42, at 217 and back cover (“[w]e ask: when may
citizens by their vote properly exercise their coercive political power over one
another when fundamental questions are at stake?”); JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY 59 (the “subject of this essay is . . . the nature and limits of the power
which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual,” which for Mill
includes both state power and non-legal customs); GERALD GAUS, THE ORDER OF
PUBLIC REASON: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND MORALITY IN A DIVERSE AND
BOUNDED WORLD 2 (“The question that has occupied liberal political theory –
whether free and equal persons can endorse a common political order even though
their private judgments about the good and justice are so often opposed – is the
fundamental problem of a free moral order”).
51 Indeed, public good requirements can be traced back to Aristotle and Aquinas.
See Eduardo M. Penalver & Lior Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due Process?,
CORNELL L. REV. at n. 50 (forthcoming 2012).
52 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, chapter XI, ¶134.
53 Id.
54 Id. at ¶135.
49
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preservation of himself and the rest of mankind,” and so Locke accordingly
concludes that the legislature’s “power, in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to
the public good of the society,”55 which he defines as the preservation of himself
and mankind. Locke consistently contrasts pursuit of the “public good” with
the illegitimate exercise of “power for [a ruler’s] private ends of their own”56
and with a ruler’s “distinct and separate interest from the good of the
community . . .”57
Public good requirements are also central to Rousseau. Rousseau
thought the state’s legitimate powers extend only to “authentic act[s] of the
general will,” meaning “the common good” or “the common interest.”58 For
Rousseau, the “general will” consists only of those desires of an individual
that are shared by all other citizens in his polity.59 For this reason, when the
state identifies and enforces the general will, it does not compel a citizen
against his will. To the contrary, limiting state power to the general will
assures that the citizen need “obey nobody but [his] own will.”60 It follows
that when lawmakers legislate, they must aim to advance only the common
good, and that they cannot act parochially “towards any particular and
circumscribed object . . .”61 This is yet another “public good” requirement.
While contemporary political theorists largely reject Lock’s
assumption of actual consent62 and Rousseau’s assumption that laws
constitute the overlap of citizens’ wills,63 most theorists continue to embrace
“public good” requirements.64 John Rawls, for example, states that “[o]ur

Id. (emphasis supplied). Locke also argues that the executive’s “prerogative”
power gives him the power to “act according to discretion for the public good,
without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it . . .” Id. at ¶160.
But the executive’s prerogative power, like the legislature’s power, is limited to that
which is for the “public good.” Id.; see also id. at ¶163.
56 Id. at ¶162.
57 Id. at ¶163.
58 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, Book 2, chapter 4, at 767 (Maurice Cranston Trans.)
59 See DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL
FRAMEWORK 103 (explaining Rousseau’s ‘general will’ as being “whatever is
common to the will of all citizens”).
60 See id. at 77.
61 Id. at 75.
62 For example, though Rawls falls within the contractarian tradition, his
approach does not rest on citizens’ actual consent, but instead aims to describe by
means of the original position what political structure reasonable persons
hypothetically would consent to. See generally, C.A. Stark, Hypothetical Consent and
Justification, 97 JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 313, 313 & n. 1 (2000). For the unusual
example of a modern theorist who retains the requirement of actual consent, see
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
OF LIBERTY 11-31 (2004).
63 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron.
64 Notable exceptions are the public choice theorists, who posit that politics is a
forum, no different from the marketplace, where people aim to advance their
55
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exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the
reasons we would offer for our political actions – were we to state them as
government officials – are sufficient, and we also reasonably think that other
citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons.”65 He dubs this the
“criterion of reciprocity,” and concludes that such reciprocity is a
requirement of “political legitimacy.”66 Furthermore (and in apparent
contradistinction to the stricter notion of Rawlsian “public reason”), the
criterion of reciprocity applies to “particular statutes and laws enacted.”67
Self-interested “naked preferences”68 cannot satisfy the criterion of
reciprocity, which accordingly operates as a “public good” requirement.
A public good requirement also features in the powerful work of
Brown University philosopher David Estlund. Estlund aims to explain the
legitimacy of democratic decisionmaking processes without relying on
citizens’ consent (since most citizens have not given their actual consent to
those processes or to the authority of the government).69 His answer is that
it is not sufficient that the democratic procedure be “fair” – for if that were
sufficient, then we should be willing to “flip a coin” to make political
decisions insofar as coin-flipping is perfectly random and hence fair –
something that no one is willing to do.70 Estlund concludes that beyond
being fair, democratic procedures must have “some epistemic value,” that is
to say they must have “a tendency to make correct decisions.”71

individual interests. I discuss these theorists below.
65 JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, WITH “THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON
REVISITED” 137 (1999).
66 See also id. at 149 (writing of “the idea of legitimacy and public reason’s role in
determining legitimate law”).
67 See id. Public reason, by contrast, “applies” only to “fundamental political
questions,” which Rawls tells us comprises “constitutional essentials and matters of
basic justice.” Id. at 133. Somewhat confusingly, however, Rawls elsewhere states
that public reason “has five different aspects,” one of which is the application of a
“family of reasonable political conceptions of justice . . . in discussions of coercive
norms to be enacted in the form of legitimate law for a democratic people.” Id.
Rawls also states that public reason limits the types of reasons that properly can be
drawn upon when “exercise[ing] final political and coercive power over one another
in enacting laws and in amending their constitution.” Rawls, supra note 50, at 214.
In short, sometimes Rawls seems to suggest that public reason’s constraints do apply
to ordinary lawmaking. No more need be said about the scope of public reason for
present purposes because the less-strict “criterion of reciprocity” applies to ordinary
legislation and constitutes a “public good” requirement, as discussed above in text.
68 See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1689 (1984).
69 See Estlund, supra note 59, at 3, 9.
70 Id. at 4.
71 Id. at 8. Crucially, the procedures’ epistemic value also must be “publicly
recognizable,” that it is to say, the procedure’s tendency to generate correct
decisions must be “generally acceptable [to citizens] in the way that political
legitimacy requires.” Id.

[2012]

Republican Legitimacy

14

Estlund generates an illuminating, involved argument that people
would be morally obligated to consent to a democratic procedure with these
characteristics, and that actual consent accordingly is unnecessary just as
moral obligations are binding without consent.72 The notion of “epistemic
proceduralism” – that democratic lawmaking must utilize procedures that
have a tendency to make correct decisions -- thus stands at the center of
Estlund’s claims. Though he does not go into the details of institutional
design,73 his theory implies the existence of some sort of “public good”
requirement because democracy’s epistemic requirement cannot be satisfied
if law-makers are permitted to pursue self-serving goals when acting in their
official capacities.74
********************************
Legitimate-Decisionmaking’s “public good” requirement means that
certain motivations behind governmental action are illegitimate. Accordingly,
the second component of Republican Legitimacy invites serious inquiry into
the type of motivations and reasons that legislators properly may rely upon –
and those that they cannot -- when they legislate. This will receive further
consideration later in this Article.75
C.

Anticipating three arguments against Republican Legitimacy

Three arguments may be asserted against the claim above that
Republican Legitimacy is a constitutional principle. First, against the claim
concerning Legitimate-Decisionmaking’s “public good” requirement
regarding legislators, it might be argued that regardless of what political
theorists past and present may have thought, any such requirement is
inconsistent with the Madisonian system that was adopted in our
Constitution. Second, it might be argued that the many well known deficits
in democracy that were present during the Founding era – best illustrated by
the exclusion of women, African-Americans, and non-property holding
whites from voting – undermine the claim that there is a constitutional
principle of Legitimate-Selection. Third, it might be argued that what I call
Republican Legitimacy is already (and better) addressed by what some cases
and commentators have called “anti-corruption.” I develop, and refute, each
of these arguments below.

See id. at 10, 117-35.
Id. at 2.
74 Indeed, Estlund alludes to such a conclusion at one of the few places in his
book where he briefly considers his theory’s concrete institutional implications. See
id. at 20 (sharing his “impression[]” that “if points of view get their influence on
public conclusions by virtue of the wealth they have at their disposal, public
reasoning will be seriously distorted unless this irrational element of power can
somehow be countervailed in creative political practice”).
75 See infra Part IV.C.1(b).
72

73
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1.
The Argument against Legitimate-Decisionmaking:
Madison and ‘Our Constitution’
It might be argued that regardless of what the niceties of political
theory might suggest, our Constitution’s Madisonian compromise is
inconsistent with the claim that Legitimate-Decisionmaking is a
constitutional principle. In the Federalist Papers, Madison famously wrote
that men are not “angels”76 and that the Constitution accordingly relies on
the principles that “[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition” and
that “the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public
rights.”77 Quoting this, Professor Adrian Vermeuel has argued that Madison
believed that “suppressing self-interest at its source is infeasible,” and that
Madison instead chose to “leav[e] self-interested motives in place while
constricting the opportunities available to self-interested decisionmakers”
and to thereby “control[] the effects rather than the causes of self-interest.”78
Similarly, it has been argued that Madison’s ideas are a foundation for, if not
a precursor of, public choice theory,79 which posits that politics is a forum
where individuals simply ought to pursue their individual interests.80
Any such Madisonian critique of public good requirements is
unavailing for several reasons. First, it relies on a partial reading – if not a
misreading -- of Madison.81
Madison’s discussion of “ambition
counteract[ing] ambition” occurs in the context of his explanation of how
“the necessary partition of power among the several department as laid down
in the Constitution” are to be “maintain[ed].”82 Madison thus was discussing
how the powers of the federal government’s three branches were to be kept
distinct. Madison’s solution was to “giv[e] to those who administer each
department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist
encroachments of the others.”83 So Madison’s discussion of “personal
motives” is not a license for legislator’s to pursue their individual preferences
when legislating, but instead refers to the powers and motivations for
members of each branch to guard against (what Madison deemed to be)
problematic encroachments from the other branches.84
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (Rossiter ed.) (“If men
were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.”).
77 Id. at 322.
78 VERMUELE, supra note 49, at 36.
79 See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION.
80 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM (B.
Grofman & D. Wittman, eds. 1989).
81 For a similar argument, see Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public
Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 38-45 (1985).
82 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320.
83 Id. at 321-22.
84 For a critical discussion of Madison’s view that each department’s powers were
to be kept distinct, see Mark D. Rosen, From Exclusivity to Concurrence, 94 MINN. L.
76
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Indeed, Madison repeatedly speaks of the legislature’s pursuit of the
“public good” and “public weal,”85 and argues that representative democracy
is more apt than direct democracy to pursue the public good: the
delegation of the government . . . to a small number of citizens
elected by the rest [will] refine and enlarge the public views by
passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens,
whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country and
whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it
to temporary or partial considerations.86

Similarly, Madison writes in Federalist 57 that “[t]he aim of every political
constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess the
most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good of the
society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for
keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.”87
These are not the words of someone who wants or expects legislators to
pursue their individual interests when they legislate. To the contrary,
Madison’s expectation seems to have been that legislators would be better
suited than citizens to pursue the public good.
There are other reasons why Madison’s views, whatever they might
have been, should not be seen as a refutation of the necessity of a “public
good” requirement. Madison was addressing the best way of structuring an
alternative to monarchy, and why the proposed constitution should be
ratified. The public good requirement, however, concerns something very
different: an account of why, and under what conditions, republican
governments can legitimately coerce their citizens. While political theorists
before Madison had labored to justify the legitimacy of the exercise of
governmental power,88 this was not Madison’s task, most likely because it
was not the core issue on the American people’s minds at the time of the
Constitution’s ratification. After all, some form of democracy was surely better
than monarchy, and that was sufficient to recommend it as the desired
political form.89
REV. 105, 1052-57 (2010).
85 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82.
86 Id. (emphasis supplied).
87 THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (Madison), at 350 (emphasis supplied).
88 For example, explaining the legitimacy of governmental power was central to
both Locke and Rousseau, as discussed above in text. Indeed, during debates
concerning the scope of the franchise in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War, a
handful of Americans made this argument as well. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE
RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED
STATES 11-12 (rev’d ed. 2000).
89 This should not be surprising, for Madison was not a systematic political
theorist. Robert Dahl demonstrates the profound theoretical inadequacies of
Madison’s political theories, concluding that Madison’s Federalist Papers are better
understood as an “ideology” that was designed to serve the political purpose of
finding common ground to facilitate ratification. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A
PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 4-33.
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Moreover, questions concerning the legitimacy of a democracy’s
exercise of power over its citizens may not have had much resonance at that
time, when only a fraction of citizens had the right to vote or hold office.90
By contrast, questions of legitimacy are pressing in the modern era, where
democracy is widespread, monarchy is rare, the concept of political equality
among citizens is entrenched, and there is pervasive recognition that people
of good will probably will never converge on what constitutes the “good
life.”91 In this environment, the question of what legitimates the majority’s
exercise of power over a dissenting minority is pressing. Modernity permits
– if not invites – the progressive refinements of enduring governmental
institutions that were created in a relatively short period of time by people
who had limited experience with democracy, and access to virtually no
models of democratic institutions for guidance.92 We should welcome, not
denigrate, the opportunity to refine aspects of our democratic system that did
not receive considered attention from the Founders.
The previous paragraph may resonate with “living constitutionalists,”
but would it be acceptable to originalists? The next subsection explains why
it should be.
2.
The Argument against Legitimate-Selection: the
‘Democracy-Deficit Refutation’
Significantly more than half of the adult population did not have the
franchise in 1789: all states except New Jersey withheld the franchise from
women,93 most states had property qualifications,94 slaves could not vote, and
several states excluded even free Blacks.95 As a matter of principle, it is
impossible to square such widespread disenfranchisement with LegitimateSee KEYSSAR, supra note 88, at 3-21 (describing the limited franchise at that
time).
91 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 42, at 386; GAUS, supra note 50, at 2.
92 See ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION? 8-9 (“It is no detraction from the genius of Leonardo da Vinci to
say that given the knowledge available in his time he could not possibly have
designed a workable airplane . . . The knowledge of the Framers – some of them,
certainly – may well have been the best available in 1787. But reliable knowledge
about constitutions appropriate to a large representative republic was, at best,
meager. History had produced no truly relevant models of representative
government on the scale the United States had already attained, not to mention the
scale it would reach in the years to come.”).
93 See Keysar, supra note 88, at 43-44. New Jersey ultimately disenfranchised
women in 1807. See id.
94 Only Vermont, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and Georgia had no property
requirements. New Hampshire imposed a poll tax, while Pennsylvania and Georgia
had requirements that the voter have paid public taxes prior to the election. Every
other state had property requirements. See id. at 306-07.
95 Georgia, South Carolina, and Virginia formally extended the franchise only to
Whites. See id. at 306-07. However, the number of states that excluded Blacks
“rose steadily from 1790 to 1850.” Id. at 44.
90
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Selection.96 As a doctrinal matter, however, doesn’t the Founding era’s
democracy-deficit demolish this Article’s claim that Legitimate-Selection is a
constitutional principle? No: any such “democracy-deficit refutation” is
without force, for three reasons.
a.

History

History provides the first reason. As Akhil Amar has explained,
much happened “in the nation’s first eighty years to give rise to a more
robustly egalitarian and nationalistic conception of republican government
than had prevailed in the 1780s,” including a “dramatic expansion of suffrage
rights, at least among white men.”97 When Congress undertook acts in the
nineteenth century that were predicated on the Guaranty Clause, Congress
relied upon its more robust contemporary understanding of republicanism,
not the Framers’. For example, Congress “judg[ed] local republicanism by
applying dynamic democratic standards in the course of admitting new
Western states,” ensuring that the new states “met contemporary standards
of republicanism.”98 Further, influential members of the Reconstruction
Congress, including Senator Charles Sumner and Representative John
Bingham, justified Congress’ refusal to readmit the Southern states following
the Civil War on the ground that those states’ disenfranchisement of free
Blacks rendered them unrepublican.99 As Amar notes, “by 1865, any state
that automatically disenfranchised a quarter or more of its freemen – as did
each ex-rebel state -- was out of the American mainstream in a way that it
would not have been in 1787.”100 In other words, it was the 1865-understanding
of republicanism – not the Framers’ understanding – that was the basis for
refusing automatic readmission of the Southern states after the Civil War.
This historical record gives rise to the first reason why the
democracy-deficit refutation is without force: our understandings of
Republican Legitimacy should not be limited by the rules-of-the-road that
were in place at our nation’s founding. Rather, republicanism’s requirements
are appropriately determined on the basis of contemporary understandings.
A dynamic approach to understanding republicanism is consistent with
longstanding historical practice.
Two possible counter-arguments may be asserted. First, the fact that
Congress understood republicanism dynamically does not mean this was
correct; perhaps Congress acted for unprincipled self-serving reasons,101 or
Though beyond the scope of this Article, some contemporary exclusions
might be indefensible as well. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974)
(upholding felony disenfranchisement).
97 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 370.
98 Id. at 371.
99 See id. at 370-76.
100 Id. at 370 (emphasis supplied).
101 For such a claim, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS 107. For
Amar’s response, see AMERICA’S BIOGRAPHY, supra note 97, at 375 & n.44.
96
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simply made a mistake.
Second, in the alternative, such dynamic
interpretation may be appropriate for Congress, but not for courts. These
two counter-arguments, however, are refuted by the second reason, discussed
immediately below, as to why the democracy-deficit refutation is without
force.
b.

Meaning versus Application

The democracy-deficit refutation has maximal traction under
originalist premises.
After all, whereas Legitimate-Selection requires
widespread franchise, the Founders countenanced a system of widespread
disenfranchisement at both the state and federal levels.
And this
disenfranchisement was not a result of oversight, but instead was an
outgrowth of a theory of politics under which voting was seen as a
“privilege” rather than a right, where only those with a “stake in society”
were “sufficiently attached to the community and sufficiently affected by its
laws to have earned the privilege of voting,” and where women were legally
merged into their husbands and virtually represented by their votes.102
Though our country’s early democracy-deficit might be troubling even to
those who do not label themselves “originalists” – for even they think
“history” and “tradition” are relevant to constitutional interpretation103 -those who do not self-identify as originalists rely on other considerations that
allow for changing constitutional interpretations.104 The Founding-era
democratic-deficit, however, might appear to be an intractable obstacle for
an originalist to conclude that Legitimate-Selection is a constitutional
principle that requires widespread franchise.
But this is not so. Let us assume that an originalist were to agree
with the textual and structural claims advanced in this Part that there must be
a constitutional principle of Republican Legitimacy. Virtually all modern-day
originalists still could conclude that our country’s early democracy-deficit
does not limit the scope of our contemporary understanding of Republican
Legitimacy. This is because most contemporary originalists draw a
distinction between constitutional meaning, which they believe to be binding,
and actual or expected applications of the Constitution, which they believe are
not binding.105 This distinction allows them to conclude that a specific view
See KEYSAR, supra note 88, at 8.
See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 8.
104 See, e.g., id.
105 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A
Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s ‘Moral Reading’ of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1269, 1284 (1997) (“Mainstream originalists recognize that the Framers’ analysis of
particular applications could be wrong, or that circumstances could have changed
and made them wrong”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution
(And How Not To), 115 YALE L. J. 2037, 2059 (2006) (rejecting a description of
originalism as being a “version of crude intentionalism that focuses on the specific
subjective intentions or expectations of individuals as to how a provision might be
102

103
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or practice that coexisted with a constitutional enactment – say the “views or
expectations of some individuals at the time [of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s adoption] that the [Fourteenth] Amendment’s principle did
not extend to segregated education” – was a non-binding “application” or
“mistake[]” that is distinct from the binding original meaning of the
Fourtheenth Amendment.106
Mark Greenberg and Harry Litman have provided the most
important theoretical explanation for the distinction between binding
meaning and non-binding applications, and it is useful to work through their
analysis to demonstrate more precisely why an originalist could conclude that
our country’s early democracy-deficit is a non-binding application, rather
than a binding meaning, of republicanism.107 Like many other commentators,
Greenberg and Litman understand “meaning” to refer to a word’s more
applied” rather than “focusing on the objective linguistic meaning of the words of a
text (taken in historical context)”); Randy Barnette, An Originalism for NonOriginalists, 34 LOYOLA L. REV. 611, 622 (1999) (distinguishing “semantic” from
“expectations” originalism and concluding that “how the relevant generation of
ratifiers expected or intended their textual handiwork would be applied to specific
cases” is relevant only as “circumstantial evidence of what the more technical words
and phrases in the text might have meant to a reasonable listener.”); Lawrence B.
Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in LAWRENCE B. SOLUM & ROBERT W.
BENNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 10-11 (concluding that “it
is the public meaning of the test (the linguistic meaning) that provides binding law.
Expectations about the application of the text to particular cases or general types of
cases provide relevant evidence of linguistic meaning, but it is only evidence”). It is
worth noting that the meaning/application distinction also is important for some
non-originalists. See, e.g., James Ryan, The New Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. xx
(forthcoming 2012) at 13 (“The Constitution, properly understood, is not frozen in
time and inextricably linked to the concrete expectations of the framers or ratifiers.
But neither does its meaning change . . . . What can change, however, is the
application of those principles over time, based on technological, economic and
cultural changes.”).
106 Paulsen, supra note 105, at 2060.
107 See Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86
GEO. L. J. 569 (1998). Mitch Berman has commented that Greenberg and Litman’s
article “demolished” the proposition that “expected applications of constitutional
provisions are binding on present-day interpreters.” Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism
and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two About Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383,
385 (2007) (commenting that was “demolished” in Greenberg and Litman’s article).
I concur as to the article’s depth and importance, though I do not agree with all its
analysis. I nonetheless rely on Greenberg and Litman’s article for present purposes
because it has been influential for originalists, and aim to show that originalists have
reasons internal to their commitments to reject the democracy-deficit refutation. My
approach is similar to the Rawlsian idea of reasoning from conjecture. See RAWLS,
supra note 65, at 155-56 (defining conjecture as arguing “from what we believe, or
conjecture, are other people’s basic doctrines” even though “we do not assert [that
is to say, personally accept or believe] the premises from which we argue, but [ ] we
proceed as we do to clear up what we take to be a misunderstanding on others’
part”).
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abstract, general articulation, and understand “application” to refer to the
concrete particulars that fall within a word’s or principle’s “meaning.”108
Greenberg and Litman then argue that applications are the result of a
meaning’s interaction with factors extrinsic to meaning. In their words,
“application may not be a reliable guide to meaning”109 because “meaning is
only one determinant of the things to which the speaker would apply the
word.”110 Greenberg and Litman go on to claim that a “speaker’s substantive
beliefs” may affect application,111 and conclude that “disagreement over
whether a term apples in a particular case can be, and generally is, a substantive
disagreement, rather than a misunderstanding about the word’s meaning,
because what a word is applied to depends not only on meaning but also on
substantive views.”112
For example, Greenberg and Litman note that the Founders would
not have expected that the Contract Clause would operate in respect of a
married woman’s contract. But this was because, during the Founding era, a
married woman was not thought to be able to enter into her own contracts;
her legal personality was conceptualized as having merged with her
husband’s. Greenberg and Litman plausibly conclude that the Founders’
expectations concerning married women’s contracts are a non-binding
application, not an aspect of the meaning of the Contract Clause.113 The
Founder’s expectation that the Contract Clause would not apply to married
women’s contracts, say Greenberg and Litman, was due to a substantive
belief external to the meaning of the Contract Clause, namely that married
women could not create valid contracts. Accordingly, that expectation is
non-binding, and an originalist could conclude today that the Contract
Clause applies to contracts made by married women.114
Similarly, it seems plausible to say that our country’s early democracydeficit (or many aspects of it, at least) was due to substantive beliefs extrinsic
to the meaning of republicanism: for instance, the view that women could
be virtually represented by their husbands, that a woman’s proper place was
only in the domestic sphere, that women and non-Whites did not have the

See Greenberg & Litman, supra note 107, at 586-91; see also SOLUM, supra
note 105, at 149(“the linguistic meaning of [a] phrase is the more general meaning).
This is not the only way that one can understand meaning. For one brief critique,
See Robert W. Bennett, Living with Originalism, in SOLUM & BENNETT, supra note
105, at 113 (critiquing the underlying assumption of many who distinguish between
meaning and application that “the meaning of vague or general language must itself
be general”). A work-in-progress of mine builds on Wittgenstein’s theory of
meaning to criticize and limit Greenberg and Litman’s argument. See Mark D.
Rosen, Stop the Beach and Originalism.
109 Greenberg & Litman, supra note 107, at 591.
110 Id. at 588.
111 Id. at 588-89.
112 Id. at 590-91 (emphasis supplied).
113 Id. at 585.
114 See id.
108
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requisite intelligence or moral attributes to participate in politics, or that only
property-holders had a stake in society.115 All of these are “substantive
beliefs” that are extrinsic to the meaning of republicanism, and the concrete
applications they produced accordingly would not be binding on Greenberg
and Litman’s account. For this reason, even originalists can reject the
democracy-deficit refutation.
Professor (and former Judge) Michael McConnell has put forward
another reason for distinguishing between meaning and application.
McConnell states that “[m]ainstream originalists recognize that the Framers’
analysis of particular applications could be wrong, or that circumstances
could have changed and made them wrong.”116 McConnell’s is a more limited
justification than Greenberg and Litman’s because on the latters’ account
applications can properly shift as substantive beliefs change even if the earlier
substantive belief was not necessarily wrong. But even McConnell’s more
limited understanding concerning the distinction between binding meaning
and non-binding applications would suffice for present purposes: my guess
is that most originalists would concede that our country’s early widespread
franchise exclusions were either “wrong,” or that “circumstances . . . have
changed and made them wrong” vis-à-vis what republicanism requires. If so,
originalists’ understanding of the constitutional principle of Republican
Legitimacy need not be limited by virtue of our country’s early democracydeficit. And this is yet another reason why originalists can reject the
democracy-deficit refutation.
Finally, it is worth noting that both McConnell’s and Greenberg &
Litman’s accounts provide theoretical justifications for Congress’ dynamic
approach to understanding what republicanism requires that Amar
documents. These accounts also provide a retort to the possibility raised at
the conclusion of the last subsection that only Congress properly has this
power: there is no reason to conclude that courts would not have a role in
sorting out binding meanings from non-binding applications.
c.

Post-Guaranty Clause Amendments

There is a final reason to reject the democracy-deficit refutation. As
Professor Amar has forcefully argued, and as many originalists agree, the
Constitution’s text should be read holistically, taking account of not only the
original Constitution but its amendments as well.117 “Each amendment aims
to fit with, and be read as part of, the larger document. Indeed, because the
See KEYSAR, supra note 88, at 8.
McConnell, supra note 105, at 1284.
117 See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 26, 29 (2000) (“The American People ratified the Philadelphia Constitution
not clause by clause, but as a single document. Later generations of Americans have
added amendments one by one, but no amendment stands alone as a discrete legal
regime.”). For a ringing endorsement of Amar’s originalist methodology by another
important originalist, see Paulsen, supra note 105.
115

116
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People have chosen to affix amendments to the end of the document rather
than directly rewrite old clauses, a reader can never simply look to an old
clause and be done with it. Rather, she must always scour later amendments to see if
they explicitly or implicitly modify the clause at hand.”118
Accordingly, it would be incorrect to interpret the original Constitution’s
“republican form of government” clause without taking account of the many
amendments that have “expanded our democracy by making citizens of
former slaves, expanding the right to vote to include women and 18-year
olds, [ ] abolishing the poll tax . . . [and] increased the voice of the people
over the voice of corporations and insiders by allowing for the direct election
of Senators.”119 Amar relies on these Amendments to conclude that the
Guaranty Clause should be read “broadly” and “dynamically” such that
exclusions from the franchise that were acceptable during the Founding era
would not be constitutional today:120 “We the People today must be
expansive even if We the People at one time were less so.”121 Amar’s
conclusions are not limited to the question of franchise, but extend more
generally to the circumstances that must obtain for republican government to
be both legitimate and stable, i.e., to Republican Legitimacy.
3.

Republican Legitimacy or Anti-Corruption?

It might be argued that Republican Legitimacy is an unnecessary
concept because it merely duplicates what some cases and scholarly writing
has dubbed “anti-corruption.”122 This criticism fails because Republican
Legitimacy is a doctrinally and conceptually superior framework, for two
main reasons.
First, there is more solid textual grounding in the Constitution for
concluding that “Republican Legitimacy” is an independent constitutional
principle than there is for “anti-corruption.” There is constitutional text -the Guarantee Clause -- that speaks explicitly about republicanism, but none
that mentions “corruption.”123 Though the Guarantee Clause only extends
Id. at 30 (emphasis supplied).
Ryan, supra note 105, at 20.
120 Amar, supra note 117, at 49-50.
121 Id. at 50.
122 See Teachout, supra note 9.
123 Another phrase akin to Republican Legitimacy, “democratic integrity,” also
has appeared in some case law. See, e.g., FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S.
449, 522 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting). While I view the phrase “democratic
integrity” as being virtually interchangeable with Republican Legitimacy, I prefer the
latter for three reasons: (1) “republican” is more accurate because the Justices
invoking “democratic integrity” have been referring to lawmaking by representatives
rather than the people themselves, (2) “legitimacy” more accurately describes the
idea that informs its contents than does “integrity” insofar as Republican Legitimacy
concerns the preconditions for law to legitimately bind citizens, and (3) the
terminology “Republican” facilitates recognition that Republican Legitimacy is an
independent constitutional principle, for reasons explained above in text. I
118
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its guarantee to states, it is hard to imagine that the federal government
would have been charged with the responsibility of guaranteeing states a
republican form of government if the federal government itself were not
republican in form. And, of course, the Constitution explicitly creates a
republican form of government at the federal level by making Congress
elected by the people124 -- something that Madison trumpeted in the
Federalist Papers.125 Once it is accepted that the Constitution establishes and
guarantees republican forms of government at the federal and state levels, the
conclusion that Republican Legitimacy is itself of constitutional stature
readily follows: the Constitution’s creation and guarantee of republican forms
of government includes the minimum conditions that are necessary to
ensure the stability and effectiveness of these institutions.126
It is harder to show that “anti-corruption” is an independent
constitutional principle. Indeed, all but one of anti-corruption’s proponents
have treated it as a compelling government interest,127 not a standalone
constitutional principle.128 Professor Teachout has provided an elegant and
illuminating argument that anti-corruption rises to the level of a
constitutional principle. While I am very sympathetic to her project, her
constitutional argument is subject to a fundamental critique from which
Republican Legitimacy is immune. Teachout grounds her constitutional
conclusion on two virtually unassailable premises: (1) the Founders were
concerned with the corruption of republican governments, and (2) many
provisions of the Constitution were directed at countering corruption. 129 But
recognize – and criticize the fact – that the proponents of “Democratic Integrity”
have not treated it as a constitutional principle, but instead as a compelling
governmental interest. See supra Part III.C.1.
124 See supra Part II.A for a full discussion of how the Constitution creates a
republican form of government vis-à-vis both Congress and the President.
125 See supra note 22.
126 For the complete argument, see supra Part II.A-B.
127 While my proposal at present may be subject to the same criticism, see supra
Part III.C (noting that the caselaw addressing aspects of Republican Legitimacy have
treated them as compelling governmental interests, not a standalone constitutional
principle), the doctrinal arguments for elevating Republican Legitimacy to a
constitutional level are stronger than those for elevating anti-corruption.
128 Indeed, Professor Issacharoff’s recent article On Political Corruption in the
Harvard Law Review considered what understanding of corruption could justify
campaign finance regulations vis-à-vis free speech challenges, but did not argue that
anti-corruption constituted an independent constitutional principle. See Samuel
Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 119-20 (2010). Supreme
Court caselaw likewise has treated political corruption as a compelling governmental
interest. See infra Part III.C.1; but see Teachout, supra note 9, at 343 (arguing that
anti-corruption is a “freestanding constitutional principle”).
129 She rightly observes that “[t]he sizes of the [House of Representatives and the
Senate], the mode of election, the limits on holding multiple offices, the limitations
on accepting foreign gifts, and the veto override provision were all considered in
light of concerns about corruption, and designed to limit legislators’ opportunities to
serve themselves.” Teachout, supra note 9, at 354. Teachout also relies on
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her conclusion -- that there exists a standalone constitutional anti-corruption
principle -- does not follow from these premises. That many constitutional
provisions are designed to counter corruption hardly establish that there also
exists a free-floating constitutional anti-corruption principle alongside these
constitutionally-created anti-corruption features. After all, it could equally
(or, arguably, even more persuasively) be said that the specific institutional
features that the Constitution establishes to counter corruption exhaust the
Constitution’s anti-corruption provisions.
Second, “Republican Legitimacy” is conceptually superior to anticorruption insofar as it better indicates its appropriate content than does
anti-corruption. My critique of Citizens United in Part IV demonstrates this
proposition at length.130 The explanation of Republican Legitimacy’s
conceptual superiority can begin here, though, with a critical analysis of
Professor Teachout’s definition of political corruption. She says that political
corruption is (1) “the use of [the] public forum to pursue private ends” and
that (2) its “centerpiece” is “intent.”131 From the vantage point of
Republican Legitimacy, the first part of Teachout’s definition is accurate but
incomplete; it correctly points to Legitimate-Decisionmaking, but
problematically omits Legitimate-Selection. To illustrate the costs of
Teachout’s conception, it provides no basis for criticizing partisan
gerrymandering by stalwart republicans who aim to minimize the number of
elected democrats not for the pursuit of “private ends,” but because they
earnestly believe the democrats’ agenda to be bad for the country.
Republican Legitimacy, by contrast, provides a basis for concluding that such
political gerrymandering is wrong even if the gerrymanderers were not
pursuing “private ends.”132
The second part of Teachout’s definition – the intent requirement –
is flatly mistaken from the perspective of Republican Legitimacy. The
legitimacy of the republican system can be undercut by negligence, oversight,
and even well-intended actions. Actions that threaten Republican Legitimacy
accordingly should be deemed unconstitutional regardless of intent. While
corruption without wrongful intent might well be an oxymoron, intent’s
irrelevance makes perfect sense within the conceptual framework of
“Republican Legitimacy.”
Interestingly, Professor Issacharoff’s recent Harvard Law Review
article On Political Corruption actually strengthens the case for Republican
Legitimacy. This is so because the conception of “political corruption” that

prohibition on titles of nobility, the treaty-making power, and the jury requirement
in federal courts to ground her thesis. See id.
130 See infra Part IV.C.
131 Teachout, supra note 9, at 382; see also id. at 374-75 (defending the
“understanding of corruption [that] focuses the discussion on the intent” of the
actors).
132 See infra Part IV.B (discussing political gerrymandering from the perspective
of Republican Legitimacy).
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Issacharoff ultimately champions is virtually identical to Republican
Legitimacy. Look carefully at Issacharoff’s analysis:
Any constitutional test resting on corruption as the evil to be
avoided begs for a definition of the good, or, in this case, the
uncorrupted. As in many areas of law in which the good state
resists simple definition, the first insight may come from process
questions – which campaign finance procedures are likely to promote
desirable forms of democratic governance and which are likely to promote
infirmities in democracy?133

Since Issacharoff is discussing campaign finance, it is clear that when
he speaks of “democratic governance” he actually means “representative
democracy.” And representative democracy, of course, is interchangeable
with republicanism. If Issacharoff’s aim is to generate legal tests that
“promote desirable forms of [representative] democratic governance” and
avoid “infirmities in [representative] democracy,” it would seem that
“corruption” doesn’t perform any real analytical work. Standing at the center
of Issacharoff’s analysis, instead, are considerations of what makes republican
forms of government work well – considerations that are more accurately
captured by the moniker Republican Legitimacy. It is better to use the more
accurate terminology because, as will be explained shortly, the term
“corruption” is misleading.134
III.

THE CASE LAW BEARING ON REPUBLICAN LEGITIMACY

Having derived Republican Legitimacy through textual and structural
analysis of the Constitution, and elucidating Republican Legitimacy’s
contents through political theory, this Part shows to what extent Republican
Legitimacy can be said to be already present in the Supreme Court’s decided
case law. To provide a quick overview, the two cases discussed in Part III.A
provide some basis – albeit an inadequately theorized one -- for concluding
that Legitimate-Selection is a constitutional principle. Part III.B shows
many other cases where the Court has recognized the components of
Republican Legitimacy.
These decisions are exceedingly helpful for three reasons. They
help flesh out the contents of Republican Legitimacy, authenticate (for those
who put trust in inductive reasoning) the conclusions of Part II.B’s topdown, deductive reasoning, and provide a precedential foothold for this
Article’s claim. But the case law does not give Republican Legitimacy its full
due – and hence does not qualify as decisive precedent for this Article’s
claim -- for two reasons. First, most of the cases treat the preservation of the
conditions necessary to maintain the legitimacy of republicanism as
sufficiently important governmental interests to justify regulation, but not as
matters having independent constitutional status. Second, most of the cases
have assimilated the preservation of the conditions necessary to maintain
133
134

Issacharoff, supra note 123, at 126 (emphasis supplied).
See infra Part IV.C (critiquing Citizens United).
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republicanism into individual rights doctrines, rather than recognizing them
as aspects of a structural constitutional principle. Part III.C explains why
these two limits of the case law are significant. In so doing, Part III
establishes why it is important that Republican Legitimacy be recognized as
(a) standalone constitutional principle that is (b) structural rather than rightsbased.
A. The Most Direct Precedent for the Proposition that Republican Legitimacy
is an Independent Constitutional Principle
There is one case (possibly two) in which the Supreme Court has
recognized that the prerequisites of representative democracy themselves can
have constitutional status.
It makes sense to discuss the cases
chronologically because the second case relied on the first.
Powell v. McCormack135 invoked a “fundamental principle of our
representative democracy” as a guide to interpreting a constitutional grant of
power to Congress. The question was whether the provision that “[e]ach
House shall be the Judge of the . . . Qualifications of its own Members” gave
the House the power to exclude a duly elected member on grounds apart
from the three requirements (age, citizenship, and residency) specified
elsewhere in the Constitution.136 The Court held that “the Constitution does
not vest in the Congress a discretionary power to deny membership by a
majority vote,” relying inter alia on “an examination of the basic principles of
our democratic system . . .”137 A congressional power to discretionarily
exclude duly elected congresspersons, continued the Court, would violate the
“fundamental principle of our representative democracy” that “the people
should choose whom they please to govern them.”138
Powell’s principle of “representative democracy” is synonymous with
the contemporary understanding of republicanism.139 Powell’s principle is an
aspect of the first component of Republican Legitimacy, i.e., LegitimateSelection. And Powell is surely correct that a discretionary congressional
power to exclude duly elected congresspersons would undermine the
legitimacy of the representative process. For these reasons, Powell is strong
precedent in support of Republican Legitimacy (or at least its first
component).
But there are two important caveats. First, Powell does not explain
from where its crucial decisional principle comes, but merely asserts it ipse

395 U.S. 486, 547-48 (1969).
U.S. CONST. ART. I, §2, cl. 2 (“No person shall be a Representative who
shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a
Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of
that State in which he shall be chosen.”).
137 395 U.S. at 547-48 (emphasis supplied).
The Court also considered the
Framers’ intent “to the extent to which it could be determined.” Id.
138 Id.
139 See supra note 22.
135

136See
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dixit. The derivation provided earlier in this Article provides solid grounding
for Powell’s principle of “representative democracy.” Second, Powell did not
necessarily hold that its principle of “representative democracy” had
constitutional status; Powell used representative democracy as an interpretive
rule for construing a constitutional text, and interpretive rules do not
necessarily themselves have the status of a constitutional principle.
Notwithstanding the two above caveats, the Supreme Court treated
Powell’s “fundamental principle” as a full-fledged constitutional principle in
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.140 Thornton struck down an amendment to
Arkansas’ constitution that set term limits for that state’s federal
representatives. Thornton’s self-proclaimed “most important” ground for its
decision141 was that term limits violated the “fundamental principle of our
representative democracy [that] the people should choose whom they please
to govern them.”142 In so doing, Thornton treated Powell’s principle as a
constitutional principle, for Thornton considered it a sufficient basis for
overturning the Arkansas law.143 “Representative democracy” is synonymous
with republicanism, and Thornton’s holding squarely concerned republicanism,
striking down an aspect of the electoral system that the Court believed
interfered with the process by which the people select their representatives.
Thornton accordingly is solid precedent for the proposition that LegitimateSelection is a constitutional principle.
But there are gaps in Thornton’s analysis. First, Thornton does not give
a satisfactory explanation of the source of the “fundamental principle of our
representative democracy;” it merely cites to Powell, which in turn merely
asserted it. Second, Thornton provides little guidance as to its constitutional
principle’s appropriate scope. Fortunately, this Article’s earlier analysis in
Parts II.A and B addresses both these lacks.
B.
Additional Cases That Address the Two Components of Republican
Legitimacy
Many cases have recognized the significance of considerations that
fall under the two components of Republican Legitimacy.
1.

The First Component: Legitimate-Selection

Let us first consider caselaw that has addressed matters that fall
under the first component of Republican Legitimacy, Legitimate-Selection.
The 1969 decision of Kramer v. Union Free School District,144 concerned the
constitutionality of a statute that barred an adult who lived with his parents
from voting in a school board election. “[S]tatutes distributing the franchise
constitute the foundation of our representative society. Any unjustified
514 U.S. 779 (1995).
Id. at 806.
142 Id. at 783 (quoting Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969)).
143 Id. at 783.
144 395 U.S. 621 (1969).

140
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discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs or in the
selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of representative
government.”145 Kramer struck down the statute, but on equal protection
grounds.146 It did not understand its concerns to be an independent
constitutional principle.
The per curium decision in Purcell v. Gonzalez147 also addressed
Legitimate-Selection when it tied its reasoning to the conditions that are
necessary for republicanism to successfully operate. Purcell vacated an
interlocutory injunction, thereby allowing state and county officials to apply
Arizona’s new voter identification rules. The Court explained that
“[c]onfidence in the integrity of our electoral processes is essential to the
functioning of our participatory democracy.”148 But Purcell held that
“preserving the integrity of [a state’s] election process” constituted a
“compelling interest,”149 not an independent constitutional principle.
The most extensive discussion of the considerations that fall under
the rubric of Legitimate-Selection is found in the campaign finance case law.
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission150 used the concept of LegitimateSelection to frame its discussion of a century of federal campaign regulations:
More than a century ago the ‘sober-minded Elihu Root’ advocated
legislation that would prohibit political contributions by
corporations in order to prevent ‘the great aggregations of wealth,
from using their corporate funds, directly or indirectly,’ to elect
legislators who would ‘vote for their protection and the
advancement of their interests as against those of the public.’ In
Root's opinion, such legislation would ‘strik[e] at a constantly
growing evil which has done more to shake the confidence of the
plain people of small means of this country in our political
institutions than any other practice which has ever obtained since
the foundation of our Government.’ The Congress of the United
States has repeatedly enacted legislation endorsing Root's
judgment.151

Supreme Court Justices also have relied on considerations of
Legitimate-Selection when striking down campaign finance regulations. In
Randall v. Sorrell,152 the Court found unconstitutional a state campaign finance
statute that imposed a $200 per-candidate per-election contribution limit for
candidates for state office. Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito, explained that although contribution limits are not per se
unconstitutional, courts must “recognize the existence of some lower bound”
Id. at 626.
Id. at 630-33.
147 549 U.S. 1 (2006).
148 Id. at 7.
149 Id.
150 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
151 Id. at 115 (internal quotations omitted).
152 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
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because “[a]t some point the constitutional risks to the democratic electoral
process become too great.”153 Contribution limits that are too low can “harm
the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective
campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing electoral
accountability.”154 Though Breyer’s reasoning reflected structural concerns,
his plurality opinion grounded its holding in the First Amendment.155
2.

The Second Component: Legitimate-Decisionmaking

Concerns that are part of the second component of Republican
Legitimacy, Legitimate-Decisionmaking, also have been recognized by the
Supreme Court. But before turning to that case law, three preliminary
observations are in order. To date, the Court’s analysis has been institutionspecific, with each case focusing on the branch of government (the
legislature, the judiciary, and the executive) whose actions were the subject of
the litigation.
This is sensible insofar as each institution is genuinely
distinctive156 in respect of both its vulnerabilities to improper decisionmaking
and as to what constitutes improper decisionmaking; for instance, a greater
degree of objectivity is expected of courts than of legislatures. Nonetheless,
that the Court has recognized a category of wrongful decisionmaking vis-àvis all three branches confirms the proposition that LegitimateDecisionmaking is a meaningful category in respect of governmental action, as a
general matter.
a.

The Legislature

Proceeding to the case law, the Court long has recognized
Legitimate-Decisionmaking vis-à-vis legislatures.
In United States v.
Wurzbach,157 a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Holmes upheld a
statute that barred members of Congress from receiving contributions for
“any political purpose whatever” from any other federal employees. The
Court upheld the statute on the grounds of Legitimate-Decisionmaking:
“Congress may provide that its officers and employees” shall not be “subjected
to pressure for money for political purposes, upon or by others of their kind, while
they retain their office or employment.”158
Consider as well the recent decision in Nevada Commission on Ethics v.
Carrigan.159 Nevada law prohibits state and municipal legislators from
Id. at 248 (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 249.
155 Id. at 261-62.
156 For an extended analysis of how the different institutional characteristics of
each branch of government should influence constitutional doctrine, See Mark D.
Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 1513 (2005).
157 280 U.S. 396, 398 (1930).
158 Id. at 398-99 (emphasis supplied).
159 131 S. Ct. 2343 (2011).
153

154
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“vot[ing] upon or advocat[ing] the passage or failure of” any “matter with
respect to which the independence of judgment of a reasonable person in his
situation would be materially affected by . . . [h]is commitment in a private
capacity to the interests of others.”160 The Court upheld Nevada’s law
against a First Amendment challenge because, inter alia, such “generally
applicable conflict-of-interest recusal rule[s]” have been “commonplace for
over 200 years” in both Congress and state legislatures.161 For example,
within a week of the House of Representative’s having obtained a quorum, it
enacted a rule that “[n]o member shall vote on any question, in the event of
which he is immediately and particularly interested.”162 And although “[t]he
first Senate rules did not include a recusal requirement, . . . Thomas Jefferson
adopted one when he was President of the Senate.”163 It provided that that
“where the private interests of a member are concerned in a bill or question,
he is to withdraw. And where such an interest has appeared, his voice [is]
disallowed . . .”164
Interestingly, Jefferson’s Senate rule justified itself by resort to
foundational principles of political theory similar to those invoked above in
Part II.B: “In a case so contrary not only to the laws of decency, but to the
fundamental principles of the social compact, which denies to any man to be
a judge in his own case, it is for the honor of the house that his rule, of
immemorial observance, should be strictly adhered to.”165 Buttressing this
Article’s claim that Legitimate-Decisionmaking is not branch-specific but
instead is applicable to governmental action in general, the Senate drew upon
an analogy from the judiciary, noting that a person may not be a “judge in his
own case.”166 The Carrigan decision likewise relied on the fact that “[f]ederal
conflict-of-interest rules applicable to judges also date back to the founding.”167

Nev.Rev.Stat. §281A.420(2), cited in Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2347. The Court
understood that the statute barred legislators from “advocating [the proposal in
which he has a conflict’s] passage or failure during the legislative debate.” Id.
161 Id. at 2348. For more of the majority’s reasoning, See infra note 167.
162 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 99 (1789), quoted in Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2348.
163 See Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2348.
164 A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE
OF THE UNITED STATES 31 (1801), quoted in Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2348.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 2348 (emphasis supplied). Curiously, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in
Carrigan did not uphold Nevada’s law on the ground that it was backed by a
compelling governmental interest, but instead concluded that no speech rights were
implicated for two reasons. See id. at 2350. First, legislative power “is not personal
to the legislator but belongs to the people; the legislator has no personal right to it.”
Id. Second, “the act of voting [by a legislator] symbolizes nothing” and therefore is
not an “act of communication” to which the First Amendment applies. Id. at 2350.
The majority’s reasoning is peculiar. Justices Kennedy and Alito each wrote
separate concurrences, with which I largely agree, strongly criticizing the majority’s
premise that anti-recusal laws do not implicate speech. See id. at 2352-53 (Kennedy,
J., concurring); id. at 2354 (“I do not agree with the opinion of the Court insofar as
160
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The concern of Legitimate-Decisionmaking also is present in the
modern campaign finance case law. Since the landmark 1976 decision of
Buckley v. Valeo, the Court has held that “[t]o the extent that large
contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and
potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative
democracy is undermined.”168 Behind Buckley’s delegitimation of quid pro
quo contributions is a theory of Legitimate-Decisionmaking that identifies
some motivations behind congressional decisionmaking as being wrongful.
To be sure, Legitimate-Decisionmaking’s scope vis-à-vis Congress
has been a matter of deep controversy at the Supreme Court. Many cases
have understood Legitimate-Decisionmaking to demand the satisfaction of
strict criteria. For example, in upholding the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act’s ban on national parties' involvement with soft money, the majority
opinion in McConnell v. FEC169 cited to earlier cases that had recognized the
legitimacy of regulations aimed at combating “undue influence on an
officeholder's judgment”170 and “the broader threat from politicians too
compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”171 McConnell also provided
the Court’s most expansive discussion to date of its theory of LegitimateDecisionmaking when it spoke of the “danger that officeholders will decide
issues not on the merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according
to the wishes of those who have made large financial contributions valued by
the officeholder.”172 However, in the Court’s more recent decision on this
issue – the controversial Citizens United case -- a five Justice majority retreated
from McConnell’s view, holding instead that quid-pro-quo exchanges are the
only types of illegitimate decisionmaking that can be regulated by
Congress.173 Justice Stevens’ lengthy dissent for four Justices reiterated
McConnell’s understanding that “undue influence” extends beyond quid-pro-

it suggests that restrictions upon legislators’ voting are not restrictions upon
legislators’ speech”) (Alito, J., concurring). Further, as to the majority’s first reason,
it is in tension with Citizen United’s confirmation of corporations’ first amendment
rights despite the fact that corporations cannot be said to have “personal” rights.
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899-900. It is more plausible to conclude that
restricting legislators’ ability to advocate and vote indeed restrict speech, but that
they are not “impermissible restrictions on freedom of speech” because there are
sufficiently important interests – preserving Republican Legitimacy – to justify
them. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2355 (Alito, J., concurring).
168 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-7 (1976). This holding has been reaffirmed
countless times, including in the Court’s recent decision of Citizens United, a decision
that constitutes a severe retrenchment of campaign finance laws. See Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909-10 (2010).
169 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
170 Id. at 150 (quoting FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee, 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001)).
171 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 150 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Missouri PAC, 528 U.S.
377, 389 (2000)).
172 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 153.
173 See infra Part IV.C.1.
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quo exchanges.174 Justice Stevens said regulations combating such influences
serve as “safeguard[s]” to protect the very “legitimacy of our political
system” against “threat[s] to republican self-government.”175 Yet as
important as Citizens United is in having cut back its understanding of
Legitimate-Decisionmaking, it is important to recognize that all Justices still
accept some theory of Legitimate-Decisionmaking vis-à-vis Congress insofar
as quid-pro-quo exchanges still are deemed illegitimate by all the Justices.
b.

The Executive Branch

Legitimate-Decisionmaking also has been applied to the executive
branch in the caselaw upholding limits on the political activities of federal
executive branch employees. An 1882 case upheld a law prohibiting federal
employees “from giving or receiving money for political purposes from or to
other employees of the government.”176 More recent cases177 upheld the
Hatch Act, which bars federal employees from taking an “active part in
political management or political campaigns.”178 The Court upheld a wide
array of statutory prohibitions179 on Legitimate-Decisionmaking grounds,180
crediting Congress’ judgment that “an actively partisan governmental
personnel threatens good administration . . .”181 The Court endorsed
Congress’ concern regarding the “danger” to the public that “governmental
favor may be channeled through political connections” if governmental
workers were permitted to engage in the proscribed activities.182 The Court
upheld Congress’ support for the “principle of required political neutrality
for classified public servants” so as to promote “integrity in the discharge of

See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 961 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 963-64; 968-69.
176 Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 967 (describing holding of Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371
(1882)).
177 See U.S. Civil Service Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO,
413 U.S. 548 (1973); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
178 Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 554.
179 The Hatch Act barred employees of the executive branch from “holding a
party office, working at the polls, and acting as party paymaster for other party
workers,” and Congress also could ban such employees from “organizing a political
party or club; actively participating in fund-raising activities for a partisan candidate
or political party; becoming a partisan candidate for, or campaigning for, an elective
public office; actively managing the campaign of a partisan candidate for public
office; initiating or circulating a partisan nominating petition or soliciting votes for a
partisan candidate for public office; or serving as a delegate, alternate or proxy to a
political party convention.” Id. at 556.
180 Id. at 556 (holding that “neither the First Amendment nor any other
provision of the Constitution invalidates a law barring this kind of partisan political
conduct by federal employees”)
181 Id. at 555 (internal quotation omitted).
182 Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 98; Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 555 (quoting and
reaffirming).
174
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official duties”183 and to “deal with what many sincere men believe is a
material threat to the democratic system.”184
c.

The Judiciary

Finally, as to Legitimate-Decisionmaking in the judiciary, consider the
recent decision of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.185 Caperton held that a
state supreme court justice should have recused himself from a case in which
the president and chief executive officer of one of the parties in a case had
made substantial campaign contributions for the justice’s re-election, at a
time when it was likely that the corporation would be seeking review of a trial
court’s entry of a $50 million judgment against the corporation. The
Supreme Court grounded its ruling in the proposition that “[a] fair trial in a
fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process,”186 and held that a judge
must recuse himself where “there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias’”
on the basis of “a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human
weakness.”187 Caperton found this standard to have been met “when a person
with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and
disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds
or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or
imminent.”188
C.

Limitations of the Case Law

The case law surveyed above in Part III.B supports this Article’s
claim that Republican Legitimacy is an independent structural constitutional
principle,189 but does not fully establish the Article’s claim for two reasons.
1.
Compelling Interests versus Independent
Constitutional Principles
Apart from Thornton (and arguably Powell), the case law examined
above treated Legitimate-Selection and Legitimate-Decisionmaking as
governmental interests sufficient to justify governmental regulation (generally
“compelling” governmental interests), but not as components of a
standalone constitutional principle. While useful, that case law does not go
far enough because there are four critical differences between a compelling
governmental interest and a full-fledged constitutional principle. I sketch
these four differences below, and fully develop them later in Part IV.
First, whereas a compelling governmental interest is a defense for
government regulation judicially challenged as infringing a constitutional
Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 97.
Id. at 99.
185 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
186 Id. at 2259 (internal quotation omitted).
187 Id. at 2262-63 (internal quotations omitted).
188 Id. at 2263-64.
189 See supra p. 26.
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commitment judicially protected by strict scrutiny, independent
constitutional principles also can operate as a sword to challenge governmental
action. For instance, a compelling governmental interest could not have
been used to judicially invalidate Indiana’s voter-identification law in the
Crawford case, whereas a constitutional principle could have.190
Second, a constitutional interest may motivate legislatures differently
than would a compelling governmental interest. Legislators may act more
responsibly if they believe their participation is necessary to fully realize a
constitutional commitment than if they are told that there is a “compelling
governmental interest” that that they act in a particular way.191 After all,
compelling governmental interests are (mere) policies, whereas constitutional
commitments are something more.192
Third, the failure to recognize a full-fledged constitutional principle
distorts analysis when that principle runs up against a competing
constitutional commitment.193 In such a circumstance, the failure to
recognize the constitutional consideration – and treating it instead as
“merely” a compelling governmental interest -- can erroneously oversimplify
the situation, making it appear that only a single constitutional value is at
stake. The overlooked constitutional principle might not be given the dignity
it deserves when a legislature considers whether to legislate or a court
reviews legislation.
Fourth, recognizing that there are competing constitutional
considerations makes clear that the situation at hand involves a conflict of
competing constitutional commitments.194 This should have doctrinal
consequences for courts. The understanding that a legislature’s decision
reflects a considered effort to harmonize competing constitutional
commitments, rather than a decision implicating only a single constitutional
principle, should generally lead to greater judicial deference to the legislative
judgment because legislatures are better suited than courts, on grounds of
both institutional competency and democratic legitimacy, to reconcile
competing and incommensurable constitutional commitments.195
For all these reasons, there is a meaningful difference between a
compelling governmental interest and an independent constitutional
principle.

See infra Part IV.A.
See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS
(showing congressional interpretation and implementation of the Constitution).
192 See Rosen, supra note 21.
193 See infra Part IV.C.2.
194 See id.
195 See id.
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2.
The Distinction Between Individual Constitutional
Rights and Structural Constitutional Principles
This Article’s claim is that Republican Legitimacy is a structural
constitutional principle consisting of the conditions necessary to ensure that
both our constitutionally created federal government as well as the States are
functional and stable republican governments.196 With the exception of the
Thornton and Powell decisions, however, the cases have addressed aspects of
Republican Legitimacy in the course of analyzing individual rights-based
claims based on the equal protection and free speech clauses. This is a
second respect in which most of the case law has not given Republican
Legitimacy its full due: the minimal conditions necessary for LegitimateSelection and Legitimate-Decisionmaking are facets of constitutional
structure, not aspects of individual rights.
But does it matter whether a constitutional principle is deemed to be
individual rights-based or structural?
A long-standing scholarly debate
addresses this very question. On the one side, Professors Richard H. Pildes,
Samuel Issacharoff, and Pam Karlan have argued that many election law
questions implicate structural constitutional principles, and that attempting to
address structural constitutional harms by rights-based constitutional
doctrines is problematic.197 On the other side, Professor Richard Hasen,
denies the existence of structural constitutional principles in the election law
context.198 Professor Guy Charles splits the baby, arguing that “it is
immaterial whether one casts political rights claims in a structuralist or
individualist frame.”199
This Article falls squarely on, and builds upon, the Pildes, Issacharoff
and Karlan side of the debate. It does so in two ways, critically and
constructively. First, in the subsection immediately below I critically analyze
Professor Hasen’s and Professor Charles’ arguments against structural
constitutional principles. The constructive support of structuralism appears
after that, in Part IV, where I identify reasons why constitutional rights
cannot be counted on to adequately protect structural constitutional

Those aspects of Republican Legitimacy that help implement the guarantee
that the states also have republican forms of government likewise are concerned
with structure.
197 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term – Foreword: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28 (2004); Samuel
Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic
Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998); Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The
Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV.
1345 (2001).
198 See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW:
JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 138-156 (NYU
Press 2003).
199 Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099, 1131
(2005).
196
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principles200 and show fallout from the Court’s failure to treat Republican
Legitimacy as a structural principle.
a. Critiquing Professor Hasen’s Wholesale Rejection of Structural
Principles in the Electoral Context
Professor Hasen, among this nation’s leading election law scholars,
argues that “structural theories are all about individual and group rights after
all.”201 He “see[s] nothing normatively improper (much less constitutionally
intolerable) about a practice that causes no harm to individuals or groups of
individuals.”202
The effort to collapse structural concerns into individual and group
rights is mistaken for several reasons. First, it is inconsistent with
constitutional text. Some constitutional provisions are primarily directed to
securing the interests of individuals, others to constituting or securing
governmental institutions.
It is no surprise that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s charges that States shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty
or property without due process of law” or “deny to any person . . . the equal
protection of the laws” have been primarily conceptualized as generating
individual rights despite the fact that due process and equal protection have
downstream consequences as to how governmental institutions operate.
Conversely, the requirement that the President “give to the Congress
Information of the State of the Union,” and those of the Bicameralism and
Presentment Clauses, are best understood as structural requirements that
determine the character of governmental institutions, though they also have
downstream effects on individuals.203
Second, Hasen’s effort to collapse the distinction between structure
and individual rights is troublesome because individual rights and structural
interests are conceptually distinct. In one direction, individual rights can be
violated even if a governmental institution cannot be improved upon. For
example, a rogue or absent-minded police officer may wrongfully search a
citizen’s home despite the fact that a fully adequate governmental policy is in
place. In other words, even if there’s nothing structurally wrong with a
governmental institution or policy, individual rights can be harmed. In the
other direction, there can be structural damage even if a governmental action

First, individual rights doctrines focus attention primarily on individuals, and
in so doing can lead courts to overlook structural harms; it is easy to overlook
considerations that doctrine doesn’t indicate are legally significant. See infra text and
note 248. Second, sub-doctrines developed in (and sensible in) the context of
individual rights may have unintended consequences if applied to structural
constitutional values. See infra text and note 255; see infra text and note 262.
201 See HASEN, supra note 198, at 156.
202 Id. at 152.
203 For example, the State of the Union informs citizens, and the Bicameralism
and Presentment requirements determine what creates federal law that is binding on
citizens.
200
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imposes no harm to an individual. Consider, for example, a hypothetical
statute giving Congress the power to approve the ambassadors proposed by
the President. Because the Constitution grants the President the power to
appoint ambassadors with the advice and consent of the Senate,204 such a
statute would enlarge the House’s power vis-à-vis ambassadors and
correspondingly diminish the Senate’s and President’s powers. This would
impose a structural harm to the governmental system established by the
Constitution, despite the fact that it would not seem to harm individual
citizens.205
To generalize, much of what the Constitution does is to establish
governmental entities and determine the relationship among them. There is
no reason to think that there cannot be constitutional harms to these
inanimate governmental structures. And, indeed, the Supreme Court long
has policed against improper incursions against these institutions by means
of the structural constitutional principles known as separation of powers and
federalism.
Professor Hasen probably does not deny the existence of structural
principles in general, but only thinks that election law should be analyzed
under the rubric of equality, not structure.206 Even this more moderate
position is untenable because it is not the case that all constitutional concerns
in the voting context boil down to equality.207 Republican Legitimacy, for
instance, concerns what is necessary to maintain the legitimacy and stability
of the republican forms of government that the Constitution creates and
guarantees, matters that are not reducible to “equality.” It does not slight
Equal Protection to recognize that democracy’s rules-of-the-road implicate
other constitutional principles as well.
At least part of what drives Professor Hasen is the hope of having
“apples-to-apples comparisons” among constitutional principles.208 But an
attempt to reduce everything to equal protection is misbegotten if, as this
Article’s analysis suggests, multiple constitutional principles are implicated in
the rules-of-the-road context.209 Analysis unavoidably becomes complex
when multiple incommensurable constitutional principles point to different
outcomes.
The attempt to reduce distinctive, incommensurable
constitutional commitments into a single constitutional currency purchases
U.S. Const. Art. II, §2, cl. 2.
The conclusion would be no different if one were to instead characterize the
statute as harming every United States citizens’ right to have an ambassador chosen
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
206 See id. at 153-56.
207 Professor Hasen summarizes his book as an argument that courts’ sole role is
to be the actor of “last resort who must referee some high-stakes political battles
and protect basic rights of political equality” and closes his book with a chapter
entitled “Equality, Not Structure.”
208 Id. at 156.
209 To be specific:
Republican Legitimacy, as well as such individual rights
principle as free speech and equal protection.
204
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resolvability only at the cost of distortion.
Further evidence that there is a meaningful distinction between
individual rights and structural constitutional interests is that this distinction
already is embedded in much constitutional doctrine.210 For example, the
distinction between individual rights and structural interests helps explain
why some constitutional matters can be waived and others cannot.211 It is the
individual, personal nature of the right against self-incrimination and the
Sixth Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure that makes these
constitutional matters waivable by individuals. Conversely, as the Supreme
Court has explained, federalism’s constitutional requirements may not be
waived by States because they are structural.212 Likewise, parties to a litigation
cannot waive Article III’s “structural” protections,213 which guard the “role
of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite
government.”214 Similarly, it is unthinkable that the President or Congress
could waive Presentment. To generalize, individuals cannot waive structural
constitutional requirements because such matters are not “theirs” to waive
on account of their structural character. Permitting waiver of structural
values would put such interests at risk.
Professor Hasen also argues that structuralism reflects “judicial
hubris” and that courts should not “make deeply contested normative
judgments about the appropriate functioning of the political process” that
structuralism entails.215 This argument fails because “[s]tructuralism is not
necessarily juriscentric . . .”216 The question of whether a structural principle
exists is wholly distinct from the question of which institution, courts or
legislatures, is primarily (or exclusively) responsible for implementing it.217
Indeed, several structural constitutional principles are exclusively or primarily
the responsibility of Congress; for instance, the Constitution’s guarantee that
210This

argument is a species of the inductive reasoning that undergirds common
law reasoning insofar as it draws a general principle from decisions that were
rendered in specific contexts. See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 22-23 (1921) (the “common law does not work from
pre-established truths of universal and inflexible validity to conclusions derived
from them deductively,” but “[i]ts method is inductive, and it draws its
generalizations from particulars.”).
211See, e.g., Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991) (“litigants may
waive their personal right to have an Article III judge preside over a civil trial. The
most basic rights of criminal defendants are similarly subject to waiver”) (emphasis
supplied); See generally Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 810
(2003).
212 NY v United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
213 See CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1986).
214 See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985).
215 Hasen, supra note 201, at 153.
216 See Charles, supra note 199, at 1113.
217For example, constitutional principles that are non-justiciable political
questions exist and are implemented by non-judicial institutions. See generally
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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States are to have republican forms of government falls to Congress under
current doctrine,218 as does the Tenth Amendment’s federalism limitations on
Congress’ legislative powers.219
Similarly, primary responsibility for
implementing Republican Legitimacy falls with the legislative branch.220
b. Critiquing Professor Charles’ Claim that the Distinction
Between Rights and Structure is Immaterial
Let us next consider Professor Charles’ claim that “it is immaterial
whether one casts political rights claims in a structuralist or individualist
frame.”221 Charles’ provides two justifications for his conclusion.
First, Charles argues that “whenever the Court uses rights-speak, the
Court is doing so instrumentally to mask and rectify structural concerns.”222 Unlike
rights claims that are grounded in equal protection or free speech, structural
claims do not have any clear textual basis and for that reason, says Charles,
have an air of illegitimacy. Treating structural principles as rights claims
“provides the patina of constitutional legitimacy – the assurance (or illusion)
that courts are not simply fashioning doctrine out of whole cloth without
regard to the constitutional text.”223
I think there is something self-evidently unsatisfying with Charles’
claim that rights claims are a ploy to give textual grounding to judicial
decisions. But beyond unsavory duplicity, it is unnecessary. Some structural
principles are reasonably inferred from constitutional text.224 Moreover,
structural inferences are a well-accepted mode of constitutional
interpretation, as is demonstrated by the well-accepted doctrines of
“separation of powers” and federalism – both of which are structural
principles that are derived by inference, not from explicit constitutional text.
Charles’ second argument is that “structural claims in law and
politics, which generally stem from democratic theory, are often amorphous
esoteric ideals that are difficult to domesticate for adjudicative purposes.”225

218See

id.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
220 See Rosen, supra note 21.
221 Charles, supra note 199, at 1131.
222 Id. (emphasis supplied).
223 Id.
224 For the classic argument, See CHARLES L. BACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND
RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). For a more recent articulation,
See Amar, supra note 117, at 28-30 (“For example, the phrases ‘separation of
powers’ and ‘checks and balances’ appear nowhere in the Constitution, but these
organizing concepts are part of the document, read holistically. Each of the three
great departments-- legislative, executive, judicial--is given its own separate article,
introduced by a separate vesting clause. To read these three vesting clauses as an
ensemble (as their conspicuously parallel language and parallel placement would
seem to invite) is to see a plain statement of separated powers.”)
225 Id. at 1126.
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Individual rights claims remedy this difficulty, Charles asserts, because
[a]n individual rights framework is how courts translate
structural values into adjudicatory claims capable of resolution by
jurists as opposed to philosophers or policymakers . . . . An
individual rights framework also helps courts think more concretely
about structural problems and may direct them toward judicially
manageable remedies.226

There are several problems with this argument. First, the claim that
“[a]n individual rights framework [ ] helps courts think more concretely
about structural problems”227 confuses the benefits of case-by-case
adjudication with individual rights. It is case-by-case adjudication – not
individual rights – that has allowed courts to concretely express what various
individual rights require. For example, the contents of and values behind the
individual rights of “free speech” and “equal protection” were initially
“amorphous” and “esoteric” in the sense that they were difficult to explain,228
and were only made concrete over time by the Court’s case-by-case, common
law reasoning. Conversely, courts have given concrete expression to
structural values (such as separation of powers) through case-by-case
adjudication.229
Second, Charles’ argument fails to explain how the use of individual
rights “translate[s] structural values” into claims that vindicate those
structural values.230 Professor Pildes has strenuously argued that it is
impossible to protect structural values if one begins reasoning from
individual rights,231 and Charles’ argument does not respond to this. Part IV
provides several concrete examples of Pildes’ general claim as it demonstrates
three reasons why individual rights cannot be relied upon to protect
structural constitutional values.232
IV.
REPUBLICAN LEGITIMACY’S EXPLANATORY POWER: REVISITING
THREE SUPREME COURT CASES
Republican Legitimacy reworks the analysis of many controversies
concerning representative democracy’s rules-of-the-road. This Part IV
applies Republican Legitimacy to (1) the voter-identification law that was
Id. at 1128.
Charles, supra note 199, at 1128.
228 See, e.g., LEONARD LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 4 (1960) (“The meaning of no other
clause of the Bill of Rights at the time of its framing and ratification has been so
obscure to us” as the Free Speech and Press Clause).
229 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
230 Charles, supra note 199, at 1128.
231 Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1606
(1999) (“The content of political rights in these cases necessarily derives from a
judgment about the proper structural aims to attribute to democracy.”).
232 For a brief overview of these reasons, and cross-references to where the
arguments are made, see supra note 200.
226
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challenged in Crawford, (2) partisan gerrymandering, which was declared a
non-justiciable political question in Vieth, and (3) the campaign finance
regulation struck down in Citizens United. My analysis of Crawford and Vieth
demonstrates two reasons why it is crucial to understand Republican
Legitimacy as a “structural” constitutional principle, rather than assimilating
it into an individual constitutional right: (a) individual rights doctrines focus
attention primarily on individuals, and in so doing can lead courts to
overlook structural harms, and (b) sub-doctrines developed in the context of
individual rights may have unintended consequences if applied to structural
constitutional values. The analysis of Citizens United shows why Republican
Legitimacy is superior to “anti-corruption” as a conceptual and doctrinal
framework, and demonstrates the significance of recognizing that Republican
Legitimacy is a standalone constitutional principle.
A. Crawford and Voter Identification
Republican Legitimacy alters analysis of the voter identification law
challenged in Crawford in two fundamental respects. First, by focusing
attention on the representative system and not just individuals, Republican
Legitimacy shows that the plurality opinions overlooked many legally
relevant facts. Second, Republican Legitimacy explains why two doctrines
invoked by the plurality opinions that blocked meaningful judicial review of
Indiana’s statute – the doctrines of facial challenges and “discriminatory
intent” – had no proper application in the case.
1.

Overlooked Facts

In 2005, Indiana enacted one of the nation’s most restrictive voter
identification laws233 on a straight-line party vote: it was supported by all
Republicans in the state legislature and received support from no
Democrats.234 The law required voters to present government-issued
identification at the polls.235 Nearly one percent of Indiana’s population
lacked such identification when the statute was passed,236 most of whom
were poor or older voters.237
The Supreme Court in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board238
upheld a lower court’s dismissal of a challenge to the Indiana statute on a
rationale that makes it very difficult to challenge voter identification laws
before elections already have taken place. The six votes upholding the
dismissal came in two plurality opinions, one by Justice Stevens (joined by
the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy), the other by Justice Scalia (and joined
See Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181, 222 (2008)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
234 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 203 & n. 21 (providing vote tally); id. at 240 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Indiana’s law was the most restrictive in the country).
235 See id. at 185-87.
236 See id. at 188.
237 See id. at 238 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
238 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
233
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by Justices Thomas and Alito). But the only harm both opinions considered
was whether the statute violated the “right to vote” under equal protection.239
Neither the plurality (nor the dissenting opinions) considered whether the
statute threatened a structural constitutional harm.
More specifically, no Justice asked whether the Indiana statute, and
the circumstances surrounding its enactment, posed a threat to LegitimateSelection. If that question had been asked, it would have been obvious that
numerous facts mentioned in passing were of crucial legal significance.
Consider the following. A conservative estimate was that more than forty
thousand Indiana voters – about 1% of the state’s electorate -- lacked the
requisite identification at the time the statute was enacted,240 and most of
these persons tended to vote democratic. Indiana was understood to be a
swing state in national elections, and it was well understood that only a few
hundred voters in another swing state had determined the nation’s President
only five years earlier.241 The Indiana law combated voter fraud in a highly
partisan way: the statute targeted a form of fraud (in-person) thought to
“favor” democrats, and left unaddressed a form of fraud (absentee-voting)
thought to favor republicans, despite the fact that the only fraud that had
been documented in Indiana was absentee-voting.242 Finally, all Republicans
in both houses of the Indiana legislature had supported the law, and all
Democrats opposed it. Indeed, Justice Stevens’ plurality opinion – which
rejected the lawsuit -- went so far as to observe that “[i]t is fair to infer that
partisan considerations may have played a significant role in the decision to
enact” Indiana’s law.243 The three dissenting Justices agreed.244
None of the abovementioned facts evidencing partisanship, however,
was legally relevant under Justices Stevens’ and Scalia’s opinions. This is not
surprising. Legal tests are reductive, identifying as legally relevant only a
small subset of the infinite facts that characterize a given circumstance. The
abovementioned facts bear on the question of whether there has been
structural harm to republican government, but do not readily fit into equal
protection doctrine, which focuses instead on harm to individual voters.
Thus Justice Stevens’ analysis was directed almost exclusively at considering
the “voters who may experience a special burden under the statute,”
ultimately rejecting petitioner’s challenge because the record did not show
“excessively burdensome requirements on any class of voters.”245 Likewise,
Id. at 1621 (Stevens, J.,); id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 218 (Souter, J., dissenting).
241 I refer, of course, to Florida in the 2000 presidential election.
242 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 195; id. at 225 (Souter, J., dissenting).
243 Id. at 1624.
244 See id. at 236 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that Indiana had enacted “one of
the most restrictive photo identification requirements in the country . . . [w]ithout a
shred of evidence that in-person voter impersonation is a problem in the State,
much less a crisis”).
245 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 200-203. The facts evidencing partisanship conceivably
could have been relevant to another part of Justice Stevens’ equal protection
239
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Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion focused exclusively on the law’s effects on
voters.246
But from the vantage point of the structural principle of Republican
Legitimacy, the above facts evidencing partisanship were crucially relevant.
A known byproduct of stricter registration requirements is that fewer people
to whom the requirements apply will vote. Republicans thought that the
law’s additional requirements would keep more Democrat-voting than
Republican-voting voters from voting. And so did Democrats. A
purposeful partisan-skewed reduction of the electorate violates the first
component of political legitimacy, Legitimate-Selection. That Indiana’s voter
identification law also aimed to accomplish a legitimate anti-fraud goal should
not provide cover for a legislature to differentially limit the electorate.247
To conclude, exclusive reliance on individual rights doctrines led the
parties and Court to overlook the legal significance of many facts concerning
the legitimacy of Indiana’s electoral system. And this allows us to generalize
an additional reason why Professor Charles is mistaken in claiming it does
not matter whether a constitutional interest is denominated as individual or
structural:248 Legal rules are reductive by nature, and individual rights
doctrines focus attention on individuals, not structure. Individual rights
claim accordingly may allow structural harms to be neglected.
2.

Inapplicable Sub-doctrines

Each plurality opinion in Crawford invoked a legal sub-doctrine that
kept each plurality from applying heightened review. Republican Legitimacy

analysis, the requirement that the Indiana law be “nondiscriminatory.” See id. at 204.
But Justice Stevens did not think the aforementioned partisanship facts relevant to
the nondiscrimination inquiry, likely because he used discriminatory in the oddly
narrow sense of meaning an “irrelevant” voting requirement. See id. at 189
(concluding that the poll taxes struck down in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1996), “invidiously discriminate[d]” because the taxes were “irrelevant
to the voter’s qualifications.”). There is one other place in Justice Stevens’ plurality
where the abovementioned facts conceivably could have been relevant. See infra
note 247.
246 See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 204-09 (Scalia, J., plur. op) (discussing what criteria
determine “the severity of the burden” that a law imposes on voters).
247 Justice Stevens suggests Indiana’s law would have been unconstitutional if
“partisan considerations . . . had provided the only justification” for it. Id. at 203
(emphasis supplied). This is too cramped an understanding of the appropriate
constitutional limitations. On Justice Stevens’ view, all voter identification laws
would pass muster under a facial challenge because all aim to accomplish at least
one legitimate goal -- combating voter fraud. This short-changes LegitimateSelection, for the reasons provided above in text. That there are legitimate policies
behind a genus of election laws should not mean that all possible species of the
election law are constitutional. I explain in a companion article what the Court
should have done in Crawford. See Rosen, supra note 21, at 46 and ff.
248 See supra Part II.D.2.
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makes clear why neither sub-doctrine properly shielded Indiana’s law from
careful scrutiny. Both doctrines properly apply to rights-based claims, but
were inapposite to the structural principle of Republican Legitimacy.
a.

The Overlooked As-Applied Challenge

Justice Stevens’ opinion assumed that the petitioners bore “a heavy
burden of persuasion” because they advanced a facial challenge.249 The
Court has explicitly stated that “[f]acial challenges are disfavored,”250 and it
has deliberately designed the doctrine so that facial challenges are much more
difficult to win than as-applied challenges. Facial challenges will prevail only
if a “law is unconstitutional in all its applications,” and “a facial challenge
must fail where the statute has a plainly legitimate sweep.”251
Justice Stevens was surely correct that petitioners’ equal protection
claims were facial challenges. After all, the election had not yet occurred, and
so no Indiana voters had yet been kept from voting. “[C]onsider[ing] only the
statute’s broad application to all Indiana voters,” Justice Stevens quickly
concluded that the State’s interests in countering fraud were “sufficient to
defeat petitioners’ facial challenge . . .”252
But exclusive focus on a rights claim led the Court and parties to
overlook the as-applied challenge that also was present. Though an
individual may not be harmed until she has been barred from voting,
structural harm to the legitimacy of republican government can arise before
election day. Voter registration laws bear on the structural principle of
Legitimate-Selection, and such laws can affect the political activities of
people and organizations before elections take place. Because laws that
undermine Legitimate-Selection can have effects before elections, as-applied
Republican Legitimacy challenges should be able to be brought before election
day. Laws that allegedly seek to differentially disenfranchise on partisan
grounds undermine the legitimacy of the electoral process before even a
single elector has been wrongfully kept from voting, and hence can properly
be subject to as-applied Republican Legitimacy challenges prior to election
day.
This is important because, as explained above, facial challenges are
exceedingly difficult to win.253 Post-election lawsuits asserting as-applied
rights claims are not adequate to protect the structural interest of Republican
Legitimacy because judicial remedies are limited. For example, courts have
only limited institutional capital to cast aside election results and order new
elections.254 Further, because legislatures make frequent modifications to
Id. at 200-01.
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 522 U.S.
442, 450 (2008).
251 Id. at 449 (internal quotations omitted).
252 Id. at 202-03.
253 See supra notes 250 and 251.
254 Cf. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE
249
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their election laws, allowing only as-applied rights claims effectively insulates
these laws from serious judicial review.
We now are in a position to appreciate another reason why Professor
Charles is mistaken in arguing that it is irrelevant whether constitutional
interests are denominated as individual or structural:255 Rights-based claims
can trigger sub-doctrines that are not applicable to structural claims. (The
next subsection gives a second example of this).
b. The Irrelevance of Discriminatory Intent
Republican Legitimacy explains why the doctrinal obstacle to strict
judicial review identified in Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion – the absence of
a showing of intentional discrimination by the Indiana legislature – should
not have barred the Court from subjecting Indiana’s statute to heightened
scrutiny.
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, which was joined by Justices
Thomas and Alito, cited to Washington v. Davis256 and asserted that petitioners’
claim failed because they could not show that the Indiana legislature had a
discriminatory intent:
[W]eighing the burden of a nondiscriminatory voting law upon
each voter and concomitantly requiring exceptions for vulnerable
voters would effectively turn back decades of equal –protection
jurisprudence. A voter complaining about such a law’s effect on
him has no valid equal-protection claim because, without proof of
discriminatory intent, a generally applicable law with disparate
impact is not unconstitutional. The Fourteenth Amendment does
not regard neutral laws as invidious ones, even when their burdens
purportedly fall disproportionately on a protected class. A fortiori it
does not do so when, as here, the classes complaining of disparate
impact are not even protected.257

A discriminatory intent may be sensible vis-à-vis individual rights, but
it has no place vis-à-vis structural constitutional principles. An equal
protection doctrine without a discriminatory impact requirement may subject
too many legitimate laws to heightened scrutiny, thereby striking down too
many laws, as a result of what might be called ‘judicial myopia.’ There are
political losers in virtually every legislative battle, and this fact of politics
ordinarily is not constitutionally problematic. Without a discriminatory
intent requirement, such “non-problematic” political losers can get courts to
focus on their loss -- without giving adequate attention to the statute’s overall
benefits which, as almost always occurs in politics, comes at the expense of
someone -- and to subject the legislation to a heightened scrutiny that seldom
LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURES OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 967 (3rd
ed. 2007)(noting that the “drastic remedy” of setting aside elections is “quite rare”).
255 See supra Part II.D.2.
256 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
257 128 S. Ct. at 1626 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
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can be satisfied when “mere politics” is the real reason for their loss. A
discriminatory intent requirement is a plausible doctrinal mechanism for
correcting such “judicial myopia.”
Critically, the risk of judicial myopia does not extend to structural
constitutional principles. If a statute imposes a structural constitutional
harm, that is a sufficient and legitimate basis for triggering heightened judicial
review because there is no larger context that conceivably could justify the
legislation. Accordingly, a structural harm appropriately triggers heightened
judicial scrutiny. And this explains why structural constitutional principles do
not contain discriminatory intent requirements. For instance, separation of
powers doctrine considers the aggregate effects of a statute on (let’s say) the
President’s powers, never inquiring whether Congress intended to encroach on
presidential power.258 This is true of both (so-called) formalist and
functionalist separation-of-powers doctrines.259 The Court’s federalism
jurisprudence likewise did not include an intentionality requirement in the
days when it judicially enforced the Tenth Amendment.260 Nor is there any
such intentionality requirement under the Court’s quasi-Tenth Amendment
anti-commandeering jurisprudence.261
That discriminatory intent has no proper application to structural
constitutional principles is yet another reason why individual rights doctrines
cannot adequately guard structural values.262 Discriminatory intent is
exceedingly difficult to establish. Beyond the “many minds” puzzle of which
legislators’ intent should matter for purposes of establishing discriminatory
intent, legislators tend to have multiple motivations when they vote, and
nowadays are sufficiently sophisticated to avoid publicly revealing nefarious
intents. Further, state legislatures – the institutions that create most of the
rules-of-the-road -- typically do not publish formal legislative histories that
reveal any legislative intent. For all these reasons, discriminatory intent is
hard to show, and doctrines that require it risk under-enforcing the
constitutional principle they implement.263
As applied to the Indiana law, the upshot is the following: showing
that the Indiana legislature discriminatorily intended to undermine the
legitimacy of the electoral process was not a prerequisite of heightened
See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (legal test is whether allowing
lawsuit against sitting president “will curtail the scope of the official powers of the
Executive Branch;” no discriminatory intent requirement).
259 The Clinton case referenced immediately above adopted a “functionalist”
approach. For an example of a “formalist” approach, which likewise did not include
a discriminatory intent requirement, see Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417
(1998).
260 See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842-48 (1976).
261 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1995), and United States v.
Printz, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
262 Pace Professor Charles, once again. See supra Part II.D.2.
263 See generally LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 84-128.
258
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scrutiny.264 Reliance on individual rights left the structural constitutional
interest vulnerable because discriminatory requirements, which are very
difficult to satisfy, are not applicable to structural constitutional claims.
B.

Vieth and Political Gerrymandering

Five Justices dismissed a political gerrymandering claim as nonjusticiable in Vieth v. Jubelirer.265 Joined by three other Justices, Justice Scalia’s
plurality opinion decided that all political gerrymandering claims were nonjusticiable political questions because there was no judicially manageable
standard. In his view, “the mere fact that the[] four dissenters come up with
three different standards – all of them different from the two proposed by
[the earlier case of] Bandemer and the one proposed here by appellants – goes
a long way to establishing that there is no constitutionally discernible
standard.”266 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which provided the crucial fifth
vote, dismissed the claim but did not categorically shut the door on political
gerrymandering claims.267
Republican Legitimacy sheds important light on Vieth in two
respects.
First, it provides a conceptual framework that faciliates
identification of overlooked common ground between Justice Kennedy and
the four dissenters. The conceptual and doctrinal clarity provided by
Republican Legitimacy conceivably could have led to a different outcome in
Vieth: a five Justice opinion permitting Republican Legitimacy claims against
partisan gerrymanders.268
Second, awareness of Republican Legitimacy facilitates recognition of
the inadequacies of the individual-rights based approach taken in Vieth. The
multiple proposed legal tests do not mean there are no “discernible
standards” to govern political gerrymandering claims as Justice Scalia
claimed, but reflect the folly of shoehorning challenges to political
gerrymandering into an individual rights-claim instead of placing them into
the structural constitutional claim in which they properly fit. Republican
Legitimacy hence shows that Justice Scalia mistook a failure to agree on
account of conceptual confusion for the impossibility of agreement.
1.

Overlooked Common Ground

The sole constitutional ground asserted by the petitioners before the
Supreme Court was that Pennsylvania’s redistricting plan violated the Equal
Protection Clause.269 This exclusively individual-rights focused approach

A companion article considers precisely what scrutiny should have been
applied to Indiana’s law and other Republican Legitimacy claims. See Rosen, supra
note 21, at 32.
265 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
266 Id. at 292 (Scalia, J., plurality op.).
267 Id. at 309-14 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
268 See supra note 264.
269 See id. 294 (noting that “[o]nly an equal protection claim is before us in the
264
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distorted the way the Justices viewed the case because it left the Justices
without a doctrinal and conceptual basis to ground the structural harms that
five of the Justices had noted. Consequently, some Justices merely made
passing comments about partisan gerrymandering’s structural harms, while
others attempted to shoehorn the structural harms (which in fact are aspects
of Republican Legitimacy) into individual rights doctrine. Republican
Legitimacy provides a coherent framework within which these harms could
have been housed.
First consider Justice Stevens’ dissent.
He thought partisan
gerrymandering ran afoul of Equal Protection, but his conception of the
constitutional harm was structural, not rights-based. Gerrymanders “effect a
constitutional wrong when they disrupt the representational norms that
ordinarily tether elected officials to their constituencies as a whole.”270 They
generate a “disruption of the representative process,” which imposes a
“representational harm.”271 Justice Stevens is describing harms to both
components of Republican Legitimacy: gerrymanders distort LegitimateSelection and undermine Legitimate-Decisionmaking.
To be sure, Justice Stevens labored to tie these structural harms to
individuals so as to fit them into Equal Protection doctrine.272 This is
conceptually misbegotten insofar as it focuses attention away from the
primary harm and instead onto its secondary consequences. And doing this
had significant doctrinal costs because, as shown above, sub-doctrines
applicable to individual rights-based doctrines frequently are irrelevant to
structural principles.273 More specifically, Justice Stevens’ individual rights
analysis triggered an equal protection sub-doctrine that shielded the claim
from heightened judicial review, as Justice Scalia convincingly showed.274
That sub-doctrine would have had no application, however, to a structural
constitutional claim grounded in Republican Legitimacy.275
Even more clearly than Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer’s concurrence
conceptualized the harm of partisan gerrymandering structurally.
Unconstitutional gerrymandering occurs when the district-drawing “fail[s] to
advance any plausible democratic objective while simultaneously threatening
serious democratic harm.”276 Breyer found “constitutionally mandated
present case”) (Scalia, J., plurality op.).
270 Id. at 329 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied).
271 Id. at 330 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
272 See id. at 323-33.
273 See supra Part IV.A.2.
274Justice Stevens analogized political gerrymandering to racial gerrymandering.
As Justice Scalia pointed out, however, the level of scrutiny under Equal Protection
turns on the identity of the harmed group, and while race triggers heightened
scrutiny, political affiliation does not. See id. at 293-94 (plurality op).
275 The level of review appropriate to a structural claim does not turn on whether
there has been harm to individuals who fall into a suspect class for equal protection
purposes. See Rosen, supra note 21.
276 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting)(emphasis supplied).
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democratic requirements”277 to be grounded in the Constitution’s opening
words.278 The contents of these constitutional “democratic requirements”
are part of Legitimate-Selection: prohibited is “the unjustified use of political
factors to entrench a minority in power.”279 Entrenchment is a “democratic
harm” that “dishonor[s] . . . democratic values” because “voters find it far
more difficult to remove those responsible for a government they do not
want.”280
To be sure, Justice Breyer ultimately grounded the constitutional
harm of partisan gerrymandering in equal protection.281 This is unsurprising
in view of the fact that equal protection was the only claim petitioners had
asserted. But Breyer’s structural conception of gerrymandering’s harm
suggests he may have been amenable to the principle of Republican
Legitimacy.
Justice Kennedy, whose concurrence provided the critical fifth vote
for Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, plausibly could have provided an
additional vote for Republican Legitimacy. Justice Kennedy criticized the
appellants’ exclusive reliance on equal protection and suggested that an
alternative constitutional principle – free speech -- may have been more
suitable to their challenge.282 Openness to an alternative to equal protection
suggests Kennedy might have been open to other grounds as well.
Further, Justice Kennedy wrote of gerrymandering’s impact on
“rights of fair and effective representation.”283 Kennedy also explicitly
framed the free speech challenge he proposed in structural terms, tying his
proposed legal test to the structural rationale that “[r]epresentative
democracy in any populous unit of governance is unimaginable without the
ability of citizens to band together in promoting among the electorate
candidates who espouse their political views.”284 Finally, and most tellingly,
Justice Kennedy closed his concurrence as follows:
The ordered working of our Republic, and of the democratic process,

depends on a sense of decorum and restraint in all branches of
government . . . Here, one has the sense that legislative restraint was
abandoned. That should not be thought to serve the interests of our

Id. at 356 (emphasis supplied).
Id. (“‘We the People,’ who ‘ordain[ed] and establish[ed] the American
Constitution,’ sought to create and to protect a workable form of government that is
in its ‘principles, structure, and whole mass’ basically democratic.”)(internal
quotations eliminated).
279 Id. at 360 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
280 Id. at 361 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 367 (referring to the “risk of
harm to basic democratic principles”) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
281 See id. at 355 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
282 Id. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
283 Id. at 312.
284 Id. (quoting California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000)).
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political order.285
This likely is Justice Kennedy’s view as to what was the most salient harm,
and it is structural in character: trauma to the conditions necessary to sustain
the “ordered working of our Republic,” the “democratic process,” and “our
political order.”286 And these are part of Legitimate-Selection.
Justice Kennedy ultimately concurred because of the “failings of the
many proposed standards for measuring the burden a gerrymander imposes
on representation rights,”287 but thought the Court “should be prepared to
order relief” if workable standards emerge in the future.288 Might he have
joined an opinion that asked a lower court to take account of the structural
harms that he himself observed? The fairest answer, I would think, is an
enthusiastic “perhaps.” The answer quite likely turns on whether such a
harm could be protected by a judicially manageable legal standard. A
companion Article argues that it can.289
Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion (joined by Justice Ginsburg) made
passing reference to gerrymandering’s structural consequences, noting that
“the increasing efficiency of partisan redistricting has damaged the
democratic process to a degree that our predecessors only began to
imagine.”290 The thrust of Justice Souter’s opinion, however, was that
gerrymandering harmed individual voters.291 But this does not mean that
Justices Souter and Ginsburg would have been unwilling to join an opinion
that forthrightly understood partisan gerrymandering as (also) imposing a
structural constitutional harm. Is it farfetched to suggest they may have
joined an opinion signed by Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Kennedy that
analyzed partisan gerrymandering under the structural principle of
Republican Legitimacy?
2. Mistaking a Failure to Agree for the Impossibility of
Agreement
Republican Legitimacy facilitates recognition of a flaw in Justice
Scalia’s main argument. Scalia wrote “the mere fact that these four dissenters
come up with three different standards . . . goes a long way to establishing

Id. at 316-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis supplied).
Id.
287 Id. at 317.
288 Id.
289 See Rosen, Implementing Republican Legitimacy, supra note 21.
290 Id. at 345 (Souter, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 343 (gerrymandering interferes with
the “right to ‘fair and effective representation’”) (internal quotation omitted)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
291 See id. at 343 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The Constitution guarantees both
formal and substantial equality among voters”) (emphasis supplied); (describing
gerrymandering as denying “each political group in a State [of] the same chance to
elect representatives of its choice as any other political group”).
285
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that there is no constitutionally discernible standard.”292 This is an unfair
conclusion because although all dissenters invoked the same terminology of
“equal protection,” they had fundamentally different understandings of
partisan gerrymandering’s harm. Justices Stevens and Breyer conceptualized
the harm structurally, whereas Justices Souter and Ginsburg conceptualized
individual-based harms. The Justices’ different judicial standards are a
natural byproduct of their different conceptions of the constitutional harm,
but do not indicate that a single conception could not be addressed by a
manageable standard. It is possible that the conceptual clarity afforded by
Republican Legitimacy could have led to agreement among the Justices. The
Justices’ lack of conceptual clarity in Vieth does not mean that agreement is
impossible once clarity is obtained, pace Justice Scalia.
C.

Revisiting Citizens United

Republican Legitimacy has important implications for Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission,293 the controversial decision striking down the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002’s (the “BCRA”) prohibition on
corporations and unions from using general treasury funds to make
independent expenditures for “electioneering communication” or the express
advocacy of the election or defeat of a candidate.294 Republican Legitimacy
illuminates Citizens United in two respects. First, as Part IV.C.1 explains,
Republican Legitimacy clarifies the nature and significance of the
governmental interest behind the expenditures prohibition, showing there
was a compelling governmental interest. Second, Republican Legitimacy
shows that deciding whether corporate and union expenditures should be
banned implicated a conflict between two competing constitutional
considerations:
free speech and Republican Legitimacy.
Congress’
considered resolution of this constitutional conflict was entitled to substantial
judicial deference.
1.

Recognizing a Compelling Governmental Interest

First, Republican Legitimacy clarifies the governmental interest
behind the campaign finance regulation. This is doctrinally critical because
all Justices accepted that constitutionally protected speech can be regulated
when there is a compelling governmental interest and the regulation is
narrowly tailored.295 Among the core disputes in the case was whether the
BCRA’s provision was supported by a compelling governmental interest.
The Justices believed that the crucial question was whether BCRA’s
ban was designed to prevent “corruption,” or the appearance thereof, of the
electoral process. “Corruption” assumed this central role because the earlier
case of Buckley v. Valeo held that preventing corruption or its appearance

Id. at 292.
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
294 See id. at 887.
295 See id. at 898.
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was “sufficiently important” to justify campaign finance limits.296 Of course,
the fact that corruption was sufficiently important does not mean that only
corruption is sufficiently important to justify regulation. But instead of
considering whether there were other sufficiently important governmental
interests, the lawyers defending BCRA and the Justices tried to shoehorn all
governmental interests into the one surefire sufficiently important interest,
corruption. This was unfortunate because, as I explain below, Republican
Legitimacy is a far superior framework for analyzing the BCRA.
a.

The Justices’ Understandings of Corruption

To recognize Republican Legitimacy’s superiority to corruption, it
first is necessary to understand how ‘corruption’ operated in the Citizens
United opinions. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion held that corruption
extended only to “quid pro quo corruption,” i.e., the direct exchange of
“dollars for political favors.”297 The majority concluded that “independent
expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to
corruption or the appearance of corruption,”298 and that BCRA’s ban
accordingly did not satisfy strict scrutiny.
Justice Stevens’ dissent adopted a broader definition of corruption.
Drawing on prior cases, Justice Stevens identified nearly a half dozen ways
that union and corporate expenditures could lead to “corruption:”
unregulated expenditures could (1) give corporations “unfair influence in the
electoral process;” (2) “distort public debate in ways that undermine rather
than advance the interests of listeners . . . [by] drowning out [] non-corporate
voices;” (3)
“generate the impression that corporations dominate our
democracy,” which could lead citizens to “lose faith in their capacity, as
citizens, to influence public policy,” to “cynicism and disenchantment,” and
ultimately to “a reduced ‘willingness of voters to take part in democratic
governance;” (4) possibly “chill the speech” of elected officials, “who fear
that a certain corporation can make or break their reelection chances;” and
(5) “open the door to ‘rent seeking that is far more destructive’ than what
noncorporations are capable of” due to corporation’ lower collective action
costs vis-à-vis individuals.299
b.

The Superiority of “Republican Legitimacy”

Republican Legitimacy is a superior framework to “anti-corruption”
for four reasons. First, Republican Legitimacy provides a more conceptually
coherent framework that explains how the welter of policies discussed in
Justice Stevens’ dissent were all parts of a single integrated principle. Second,
Republican Legitimacy points to other lines of caselaw that supported the

424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909-10.
298 Id. at 909.
299 Id. at 974-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
296
297
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dissent’s position. Third, the understanding that BCRA’s goal was to secure
Republican Legitimacy, rather than to address corruption, sheds a spotlight
on two extraordinary logical gaps in the majority’s reasoning. Finally,
Republican Legitimacy provides a principled basis for concluding that the
BCRA was supported by a compelling governmental interest.
i.

Conceptual Clarity

Consider first the many forms of “corruption” Justice Stevens
identifies in his dissent. As presented in his opinion, they can seem like a
disjointed laundry-list. Indeed, it is not without cause that Professor Hasen
has written that although Stevens’ analysis contains “many provocative and
important ideas,” it “as a whole . . . does not cohere.”300
While Stevens’ arguments may not “cohere” under an anti-corruption
rationale,301 this does not mean that they cannot cohere. The coherence
problem lies not with Stevens’ justifications, but with the organizing rubric
of anti-corruption. Republican Legitimacy, by contrast, perfectly captures the
potential harms Stevens identified. The apparently disparate list of dangers
fall into two categories that by now should be familiar: threats to (1)
Legitimate-Selection (rationales 1-3) and (2) Legitimate-Decisionmaking
(rationales 4-5).
To see that Justice Stevens was speaking more about Republican
Legitimacy than corruption, consider his response to Justice Kennedy’s
argument that corruption extends only to quid-pro-quo exchanges. Justice
Stevens wrote that “[t]here are threats of corruption that are far more
destructive to a democratic society than the odd bribe.”302 Stevens’
explanation is more naturally and compellingly conceptualized as addressing
the governmental interest in guarding Republican Legitimacy. Stevens spoke
of the danger that “private interests are seen to exert outsized control over
officeholders solely on account of the money spent on (or withheld from)
their campaigns . . .”303 Instead, officeholders must “decide issues . . . on the
merits or the desires of their constituencies, . . . not according to the wishes
of those who have made large financial contributions – or expenditures –
valued by the officeholder.”304 Justice Stevens called this the concern that
some non-constituents will have an “undue influence,” or “improper
influence,[]” on officeholders’ decisionmaking.305 Furthermore, he wrote,

Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 989, 999 (2011).
301 While Professor Hasen argued that Justice Stevens’ explanations did not
amount to a coherent anti-distortion rationale, Justice Stevens himself equated anticorruption with antidistortion, See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 970-71 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
302 Id. at 962-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
303 Id.
304 Id. (quoting from McConnell, 540 U.S. at 153).
305 Id. at 962-63 & nn. 63-65.
300
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[t]here should be nothing controversial about the proposition that
the influence being targeted is ‘undue.’
In a democracy,
officeholders should not make public decisions with the aim of
placating a financial benefactor, except to the extent that the
benefactor is seen as representative of a larger constituency or its
arguments are seen as especially persuasive.306

In short, though Justice Stevens used the terminology of “corruption,” he
actually was drawing on a theory of what constitutes illegitimate
decisionmaking by elected representatives, i.e., Legitimate-Decisionmaking.307
Framing Justice Stevens’ argument as the claim that BCRA aimed to
secure Legitimate-Decisionmaking significantly strengthens the argument. In
addition to revealing the conceptual unity behind what at first appears to be
disparate policies, Republican Legitimacy provides a principled reason to
conclude that BCRA was supported by a compelling governmental interest.
BCRA targeted what Congress believed to be improper influences on
legislators’ decisionmaking: Congress thought corporate and union
expenditures posed a particularly acute risk that legislators would support
policies for reasons of illegitimate self-interest. Because maintaining
Republican Legitimacy constitutes a constitutional interest, governmental
policies that target threats to Republican Legitimacy satisfy the compelling
governmental interest test.308
Further, grounding Stevens’ argument in Republican Legitimacy
invokes the case law and theoretical considerations examined earlier that
explain the need for, and contents of, Legitimate-Decisionmaking.309
Government officials must act impartially in the public interest, and “selfinterested behavior by government officials”310 can be unconstitutional
without rising to the level of “corrupt.” Consider in this regard the “conflictof-interest recusal rule[s]” in Congress and “virtually every State” that were
canvassed (and upheld) in Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan.311 The
criteria for recusal – when a legislator “is immediately and particularly
Id. at n. 63.
Consider, as well, Justice Stevens’ executive summary of the BCRA’s goal: to
“safeguard the integrity, competitiveness, and democratic responsiveness of the
electoral process.” Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 974-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This
is conceptually connected to Republican Legitimacy, not to anti-corruption.
308 The analysis above in text does not mean that all expenditure restrictions
would be constitutional. Regulations still would have to satisfy the narrowly tailored
standard, meaning that restrictions that selectively disadvantaged a political party or
ideology would be unconstitutional.
309 See supra Part II.B.2.
310See VERMEULE, supra note 49, at 4-5.
311 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2348-49 (2011). Though Carrigan was decided after Citizens
United, legislative anti-recusal rules date back to a week after the First Congress
convened, See id. at 2348. “[T]he long-recognized need for legislative recusal” is
itself powerful evidence of the need’s legitimacy. Id. at 2347-48. And as explained
above in text, the need for such recusal rules is grounded in LegitimacyDecisionmaking.
306
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interested or a judge has “personal bias or prejudice” – are triggered by
circumstances that fall short of “corruption.” This is so because the recusal
criteria are not aimed at corruption, but at maintaining the legitimacy and
dignity of government.312
In short, like the recusal rules at issue in Carrigan, BCRA was an
instance of the legislature policing itself. The Carrigan Court was substantially
deferential to legislative self-policing,313 even when it trenched on legislators’
political advocacy; the Carrigan majority upheld not only Nevada’s voting
ban, but also rules that “forbid [the legislator] to ‘advocate the passage or
failure’ of the proposal – evidently meaning advocating its passage or failure
during the legislative debate.”314 The Citizens United Court likewise should
have been more deferential to Congress’ self-policing in BCRA.
ii. Gaps in the Majority’s Logic
Republican Legitimacy sheds light on a logical flaw in Justice
Kennedy’s decision for the majority. Consider Justice Kennedy’s argument
as to why preventing quid-pro-exchanges of “dollars for political favors” is
the only anti-corruption interest that constitutes a compelling governmental
interest.315
Kennedy stated that even though corporate and union
expenditures may be intended by their donors to secure influence over
legislators, “favoritism and influence are not avoidable in representative
politics.”316 Not only can they not be avoided, but they are desirable in
Kennedy’s view:
It is in the nature of an elected representative to favor certain
policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and
contributors who support those policies. It is well understood that
a substantial and legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a
vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate over another
is that the candidate will respond by producing those political
outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised on
responsiveness.

The Senate’s recusal rules, adopted when Thomas Jefferson was President of
the Senate, explain that not having such rules would be “so contrary not only to the
laws of decency, but to the fundamental principles of the social compact, which
denies to any man to be a judge in his own case,” and goes on to say that “it is for
the honor of the house that this rule, of immemorial observance, should be strictly
adhered to.” Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2348, quoting PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE, supra
note 164, at 31.
313 To be sure, under the Carrigan majority’s analysis, the Court was not being
deferential to legislative self-policing because the recusal rules did not affect
constitutionally protected speech. I criticized this reasoning, and explained above
why the recusal statutes indeed regulated constitutionally protected speech, but did
so in a permissible fashion. See supra note 167.
314Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2347.
315 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909-10.
316 Id.
312
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In short, “favoritism and influence” are the other side of the coin of
representatives’ responsiveness to constituents’ preferences -- and
responsiveness is a normative good in a representative democracy.
When examined through the lens of “anti-corruption,” Justice
Kennedy’s position may seem plausible. After all, do the activities listed in
Justice Stevens’ dissent really constitute corruption? Is it corrupt for
corporations to aim to influence who gets elected and how their
representatives vote, and if corporations can spend more money than
individuals to influence elections? Is it corrupt for a legislator to be
influenced by the donations of his contributors? Given the amorphousness
of corruption, and its usual requirement of bad intent,317 there is plausibility
to Justice Kennedy’s conclusion that these phenomena do not constitute
“corruption.”
Kennedy’s argument looks very different, however, through the lens
of Republican Legitimacy. As explained above, Justice Stevens’ position is
best understood as the claim that BCRA guarded Legitimate-Decisionmking.
Thusly understood, Justice Kennedy’s argument was a non-sequitur.318 Justice
Kennedy’s truism – that at an officeholder invariably favors one policy (and
hence voter preference) over another policy (and voter preference) – is
irrelevant to whether a class of illegitimate legislative motivations exists.
Similarly, that representatives should be responsive to their constituents’
preferences does not mean that there does not exist a category of
“illegitimate” or “undue” constituent influence, as Justice Stevens claimed.
For these reasons, Justice Kennedy’s position does not respond at all to the
best understanding of Justice Stevens’ argument.
2.

Recognizing a Constitutional Conflict

Republican Legitimacy could have had another important implication
for the BCRA. Republican Legitimacy makes clear that the BCRA implicated
two competing constitutional principles:
speech and Republican
Legitimacy.319 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority did not analyze
BCRA this way: it viewed BCRA as an inexplicable disregard of one
constitutional commitment (speech),320 not as a resolution of a difficult

See Teachout, supra note 9, at 382 (arguing that bad intent is the “centerpiece”
of political corruption).
318 While the idea of illegitimate legislative motivations may be missed under a
“corruption” rubric, this idea stands front-and-center of Republican Legitimacy’s
concern with Legitimate-Decisionmaking.
319 While BCRA admittedly limited speech, it also advanced Republican
Legitimacy. Striking the ban arguably came at the expense of the constitutional
value of Republican Legitimacy.
320 See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 898 (“political speech must prevail against
laws that would suppress it”). Though Justice Stevens at one point referred to the
necessity of “balanc[ing] competing constitutional concerns,” id. at 969 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), he was referring to the competing First Amendment interests of the
317
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constitutional conflict. Of course Congress hadn’t actually realized this since
it had not recognized Republican Legitimacy to be a constitutional principle.
But if Congress had – if the BCRA were the considered judgments of
Congress and the President as to how competing constitutional principles
should be harmonized – then their judgment should have received significant
judicial deference.321
There are two reasons such deference would have been appropriate.
First, there is no objective way to reconcile competing incommensurable
constitutional commitments.322 Greater weight must be given to one, and
deciding the extent to which one prevails over the other is an unavoidably
subjective judgment.323 The political branches are better suited than courts to
harmonizing incommensurable constitutional commitments on basic
democratic grounds due to harmonization’s inescapable subjectivity.324 In
speaker (corporations and unions) and the public, not to conflicts among distinct
constitutional principles. See id.
321 Courts and scholars have given surprisingly little attention to conflicts
between constitutional principles. Justice Breyer has come closest. When analyzing
a campaign finance limitation in one pre-Citizens United case, Breyer proposed a
deferential standard of review “where constitutionally protected interests lie on both
sides of the legal equation.” Nixon, 528 U.S. at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(emphasis supplied). But the “competing constitutionally protected interests” of which
Breyer spoke, id. at 402 (emphasis supplied), is not the same as two competing
constitutional principles. Indeed, the cases he cited concerned non-constitutional
governmental interests sufficiently important to justify the regulation of speech, see
id. (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988), which held that a person’s
“well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home” is a “significant government
interest”) and circumstances where two parties had competing speech interests, see
Nixon, 528 U.S. at 403 (citing numerous such cases).
Two recent books, which focus primarily on human rights law and the
European Court of Human Rights, address the related issue of how conflicting rights
should be adjudicated. See GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, PHILOSOPHER KINGS? THE
ADJUDICATION OF CONFLICTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL VALUES (2011);
LORENZO ZUCCA, CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMAS (2007). Though BCRA concerns
the different issue of a conflict between a constitutional right and a structural
constitutional principle, many of Professor Christie’s ideas are nevertheless
applicable. A work-in-progress of mine provides a comprehensive treatment to
conflicts among constitutional principles.
That is to say, the two principles cannot be reduced to a common metric that
would then allow for an objectively correct decision to harmonize the conflict by
choosing the principle with the highest value. See generally CHRISTIE, supra note
321, at 168 (providing a clear discussion of the incommensurability of constitutional
values). In theory, the statement above in text is not true for an originalist if
originalist sources considered and definitively resolved the conflict. In practice,
originalist sources seldom if ever do so.
323 See, e.g., CHRISTIE, supra note 321, at 167 (concluding that when human
rights conflict, judges “are in fact choosing between values”).
324 See Mark D. Rosen, Why The Defense of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?)
Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors That
322
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fact, the same reasons that democracies place primary responsibility in
legislatures to harmonize incommensurable non-constitutional public policies
suggest that legislatures also should be primarily responsible for reconciling
competing constitutional commitments.
Second, legislatures frequently have greater institutional expertise
than courts in ferreting out and understanding the empirical judgments that
are relevant to reconciling competing constitutional principles. This
unquestionably is the case with election regulation. Justice Breyer is right that
“the legislature understands the problem – the threat to electoral integrity,
the need for democratization – better than [courts] do” and that the court
accordingly should “defer to [Congress’] political judgment that unlimited
spending threatens the integrity of the electoral process.”325 So was Justice
White’s dissent in Buckley, where he observed that “Congress was plainly of
the view that these expenditures also have corruptive potential; but the Court
strikes down the provision, strangely enough claiming more insight as to
what may improperly influence candidates than is possessed by . . . many
seasoned professionals who have been deeply involved in elective processes
and who have viewed them at close range over many years.”326
For these reasons, courts should give significant deference to the
political branches’ considered judgments as to how competing constitutional
commitments should be harmonized. The judicial role should be to “ask[]
whether the statute burdens any one such interest in a manner out of
proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon the others . . .”327 Congress’
judgment should be judicially overridden only when there may be failures in
the political process that undermine faith in the political branches’
decisions.328 The usual circumstances that lead to judicial suspicion of the
political processes – such as the presence of discrete and insular minorities329
-- are absent from the instant context of campaign finance. The one
concern is whether the congressional judgment was a form of self-dealing
that harmed unrepresented outsiders330 –people not currently in the
legislature who might want to run for election in the future. The most
important question for determining the appropriate level of judicial deference
is whether a campaign finance enactment had the intention, or effect, of
protecting incumbents by making it more difficult for challengers.331

Determine What the Constitution Requires, 90 MINN. L. REV. 915, 967-70 (2006).
325 Nixon, 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis supplied).
326 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 260-61 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
327 See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring); but see supra note 321
(discussing the limitations of Breyer’s approach in Nixon).
328 Id. at 402-03; cf. ELY, supra note 328, at 73-180 (arguing that the judiciary’s
interference with ordinary majoritarian politics is appropriate where there are
failures in the democratic process).
329 See United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938).
330 ELY, supra note 328, at 83-88.
331 Cf. Randall v. Sorell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006), discussed supra Part III.C.2(a).
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Challengers, after all, are generally less known to the public than incumbents,
and challengers accordingly might be more harmed than incumbents by
fundraising restrictions.332
If Congress enacted BCRA for the purpose of protecting itself, such
a judgment clearly would not be deserving of judicial deference. A difficult
question would be presented if, even absent any incumbent-protection intent
on the part of Congress, campaign finance regulations had the effect of
protecting incumbents. Establishing that campaign finance has such an
effect, however, ought to require serious empirical analysis, not just armchair
theorizing.333 But even if campaign finance could be shown to have some
incumbency-protecting effects, thereby diminishing or eliminating judicial
deference to the legislature’s judgment, such effects should not ipso facto lead
to a court’s conclusion that the legislation is unconstitutional. Campaign
finance regulations conceivably could have sufficiently important
countervailing benefits vis-à-vis other aspects of Republican Legitimacy.
Determining what if any connection there is between campaign
finance and incumbency-protection lies beyond the scope of this Article.
What is relevant is that the constitutional principle of Republican Legitimacy
identifies a crucial issue that was almost entirely absent from the Court’s
analysis in Citizens United:334 determining whether campaign finance
regulations are a form of incumbent-protection is necessary to determining
the judicial deference that should be given to the political branches’
considered harmonization of the competing constitutional commitments of
free speech and Republican Legitimacy.
V. CONCLUSION (AND PROLOGUE)
First, a brief conclusion. Partisan gerrymandering and burdensome
identification requirements that discourage certain populations from voting
harm individuals, but they also threaten structural constitutional harms to
representative democracy. To date, case law has recognized only the former
type of harm -- individual-rights based claims sounding in equal protection
and free speech. This Article identified the structural constitutional interest

See Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumption and Undemocratic Consequences of
Campaign Finance Reform, 105 Yale L. J. 1049, 1072-73 (1996) (arguing that
“[c]ontribution limits tend to favor incumbents by making it harder for challenges to
raise money and thereby made credible runs for office”).
333 The strongest argument that campaign finance regulations protect incumbents
was short on empirics. See Smith, supra note 332, at 1072-75.
334 In some of the cases prior to Citizens United, Justices Scalia and Kennedy had
explicitly accused campaign finance of being an incumbency-protection ploy. See,
e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part); McConnell, 540 U.S. at
306 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part). The more liberal members of the Court have
offered up arguments in opposition. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 968-970
(Stevens, dissenting). While the majority opinion in Citizens United did not explicitly
invoke the incumbency-protection accusation, Justice Stevens’ dissent did. See id.
332
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that also is endangered -- Republican Legitimacy – and explains why it is
important that Republican Legitimacy be recognized as a standalone,
structural constitutional principle.
Now to the prologue.335 While courts have a vital role in
implementing Republican Legitimacy -- courts should identify Republican
Legitimacy as a constitutional principle, define it, and determine what role
they and other governmental institutions properly play in securing
Republican Legitimacy – they are incapable of fully enforcing it on their own.
Inherently political considerations appropriately inform many of the rules-ofthe-road of representative democracy. Legislatures have better access to the
information that properly informs -- and are better institutionally constituted
to making the hard tradeoffs among the competing legitimate commitments
that invariably lie behind – most of representative democracy’s rules-of-theroad. Further, courts are a poor institutional context for distinguishing
between reasonable and unreasonable compromises among legitimate
considerations, though they can play an important back-up role in policing
(and hopefully thereby deterring) egregious violations.
This means that the political branches themselves must be primarily
responsible for protecting Republican Legitimacy. This can be done if
legislatures choose representative democracy’s rules-of-the-road by means of
“tempered” rather than run-of-the-mill “hard-ball” politics. Tempered
politics refers to a set of norms that aim to harness politicians’ compromiseseeking and deal-making skills, while ensuring that the legislative outcomes
constitute reasonable compromises that do not undermine Republican
Legitimacy. Tempered politics tempers the ordinary rough-and-tumble of
politics in two respects: decisions implicating Republican Legitimacy must
be (1) bipartisan, rather than deeply partisan, and (2) commonwealth
directed, rather than self-interested or party-interested. In short, tempered
politics is the higher-order care we expect when politicians consider
constitutional amendments. And this is sensible insofar as the rules-of-theroad of representative democracy implicate constitutional matters.
But how realistic is it to expect that legislators will self-regulate, and
act in accordance with the norms of tempered politics? They are the ones,
after all, who have harmed Republican Legitimacy in the first place.
Fortunately, there are two reasons why reliance on legislatures is not
a “self-defeating proposal” that unrealistically asks the legislatures to
overcome the very weaknesses that my proposal aims to remedy.336 First,
there is no reason to presume that legislators won’t take seriously their oaths
to uphold the Constitution once they understand that it contains the
principle of Republican Legitimacy. Second, most harms to Republican
335

A companion article addresses the issues that follow. See Rosen, supra note

21.
For the concept of self-defeating proposals, see Adrian Vermeule, SelfDefeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV 631, 636-40
(2006).
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Legitimacy have been created by state legislatures – the institutions that are
presumptively, and primarily, responsible under the Constitution for
establishing the rules governing both state and federal elections.337 Congress
faces different incentives that insulate Congress from many of the pressures
to which state legislatures are subject. There are several legislative strategies
Congress can use to encourage states to act consistently with tempered
politics. Their detailed elaboration, however, must await another day.
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